The Supreme Court’s 1991–1992 Labor and Employment Law Term by Hartley, Roger C.
The Catholic University of America, Columbus School of Law 
CUA Law Scholarship Repository 
Scholarly Articles and Other Contributions Faculty Scholarship 
1992 
The Supreme Court’s 1991–1992 Labor and Employment Law 
Term 
Roger C. Hartley 
The Catholic University of America, Columbus School of Law 
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.edu/scholar 
 Part of the Labor and Employment Law Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Roger C. Hartley, The Supreme Court’s 1991–1992 Labor and Employment Law Term, 8 LAB. LAW. 757 
(1992). 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Faculty Scholarship at CUA Law Scholarship 
Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in Scholarly Articles and Other Contributions by an authorized 
administrator of CUA Law Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact edinger@law.edu. 
757
The Supreme Court's 1991-1992
Labor and Employment Law Term
Professor Roger C. Hartley
Columbus School of Law
The Catholic University of America
Washington, D.C.
I. Private-Sector Labor-Management Relations
(Taft-Hartley Act)
Lechmere v NLRB
Nonemployee Access to Employer Property
Thomas J.: "[S]o long as nonemployee union organizers have
reasonable access to employees outside an employer's prop-
erty, the requisite accommodation has taken place. It is only
where such access is infeasible that it becomes necessary and
proper to ... balanc[e] the employees' and employers'
rights ......
For the sixth time in thirty-five years, the Supreme Court this
Term revisited the question of the employer's right to exclude
nonemployees from its property.' In Lechmere v NLRB, the Court,
for the fifth time in those six efforts, upheld the employer's prop-
erty interest over the nonemployees' attempt to gain access. A pattern
could be developing here.
Time will tell whether Lechmere, Justice Thomas's first labor
law decision, becomes the most important labor and employment law
case of the Court's 1991 Term. However, it certainly has been among
the most celebrated in the newspapers, 2 in the law reviews, 3 and
among lawyers at professional meetings. 4 The decision split the Court
1. See Lechmere v NLRB, 112 S Ct 841 (1992). See also, Sears, Roebuck & Co. v
San Diego County Dist. Council of Carpenters, 436 US 180 (1978); Hudgens v NLRB,
424 US 507 (1976); Central Hardware Co. v NLRB, 407 US 539 (1972); Food Employees
v Logan Valley Plaza, Inc., 391 US 308 (1968); NLRB v Babcock & Wilcox Co., 351
US 105 (1956).
2. See, for example, Ruth Marcus, Court Relaxes Voting Act Restraints; In Sepa-
rate Case, Union Organizers' Access to Workers Is Curbed, Washington Post A6 (Jan
28, 1992).
3. See, for example, Gorman, Union Access to Private Property: A Critical Assess-
ment of Lechmere, Inc. v NLRB, 9 Hofstra Lab L J 1 (1991).
4. See, for example, R. Joy, Lechmere Inc. v NLRB: The Return to Babcock &
Wilcox, paper delivered to the Committee on the Development of the Law Under the
National Labor Relations Act of the ABA Section on Labor and Employment Law at
its annual mid-winter meeting, Casa Marina Resort, Mar 1-5, 1992.
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(6-3) and generated two dissents-one by Justice White (joined by
Justice Blackmun) and one by Justice Stevens.
Commentators, as well as the dissents in Lechmere,5 have eval-
uated whether the majority's decision (1) adhered to its rules of
deferral to administrative agencies, and (2) adequately incorporated
post-Babcock & Wilcox developments in the law of nonemployee
access. I shall not address those issues again here. Existing schol-
arship on these questions is outstanding and, in any event, it is
somewhat late in the day to be overly concerned with whether the
Board's movement in 1986 into the rule of Fairmont Hotel Co. 6 or
the subsequent adjustment two years later in Jean Country7 repre-
sented a proper reading of Babcock & Wilcox 8 and its progeny.9
Rather, I shall attempt to clarify what Lechmere held, and did
not hold, and discuss whether the majority, as it repeatedly declared,
did nothing more than adhere to the Court's landmark decision in
NLRB v Babcock & Wilcox Co.
In what Professor Karl Klare has termed the "judicial deradi-
calization of the Wagner Act," 10 the Supreme Court in 1956 checked
the NLRB's efforts to provide workers' access to nonemployee union
organizers, at their place of work. The Board had taken the position
in Babcock & Wilcox that employees have the right to receive infor-
mation about the benefits of self-organization. To make that right
meaningful, employees should not be required to receive self-organ-
ization information through "personal contacts on streets or at home,
telephones, letters or advertised meetings... ."11 In the Board's view,
"the place of work [is] so much more effective a place for commu-
nication of information that ... the employer is guilty of an unfair
labor practice for refusing access to company property to union
organizers.' 2 Hence, in Babcock & Wilcox, the Board ordered the
employer to give the union access to its property because the Board
found that the only safe and practicable place for the distribution
of union literature at the employees' place of work was the employ-
er's parking lot and the walkway from it to the gatehouse.
Though recognizing that the right to self-organization includes
the right to learn the advantages of self-organization from others,
5. See references cited in notes 2-4.
6. 282 NLRB 139 (1986).
7. 291 NLRB 11 (1988).
8. 351 US 105 (1956).
9. For a thorough review of the pre-Lechmere developments, see Ford, The NLRB,
Jean Country, and Access To Private Property: A Reasonable Alternative to Reason-
able Alternative Means of Communication Under Fairmont Hotel, 13 George Mason
U L Rev 683 (1991).
10. Klare, Judicial Deradicalization of the WagnerAct and the Origins of Modern
Legal Consciousness, 1937-1941, 62 Minn L Rev 265 (1978).
11. Babcock & Wilcox, 351 US at 111.
12. Id.
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including nonemployee union organizers, the Supreme Court was not
prepared to agree with the NLRB that this always required access
to employees at their place of employment. The Board's view failed
adequately to consider the employer's legitimate property interest
in excluding trespassers. When employees are isolated from normal
contacts, this property interest must yield. That had been recog-
nized previously. 3 The challenge to the Court in Babcock & Wilcox
was to decide if the employer's property interest must yield in other
contexts.
It is here that the Court sowed the seeds of confusion that would
perplex an entire generation of labor lawyers and adjudicators. The
employer's property right must yield if the plants' location and the
employees' living quarters "place the employees beyond the reach
of reasonable union efforts to communicate with them.' 4 However,
the term "reasonable union efforts to communicate with them" is
susceptible to at least two quite different interpretations.
It might mean that the Board and the courts are to examine only
whether the union literally has the al~ility to gain access to the
employees by exercising reasonable efforts. This inquiry would not
examine the quality of the resulting communication. So read, the
union would lose in all cases other than when employees literally
are beyond the union's reach due to their isolation from normal
contacts. Babcock & Wilcox contains language supporting this phys-
ical proximity view of the test. 5
The concept "reasonable union efforts to communicate with
[employees]" can have a quite different meaning, however. It can
mean that the effort is a "reasonable one" only if the resulting
communication is meaningful. At another point in Babcock & Wilcox,
the Court clearly indicated that the "effectiveness" of the resulting
communication would measure whether the union's effort to use
alternative means was "reasonable.' 6
As too often is the case, Babcock & Wilcox was not a model of
clarity. Lechmere edged the law toward the physical proximity view
of Babcock & Wilcox, but did not abandon completely the notion that
the effectiveness of the resulting communication is a relevant
13. See, for example, NLRB v Lake Superior Lumber Corp., 167 F2d 147 (6th Cir
1948).
14. Babcock & Wilcox, 351 US at 113.
15. The Court at one point said that "an employer may validly post his property
against nonemployee distribution of union literature if reasonable efforts by the union
through other available channels of communication will enable it to reach the employ-
ees with its message .... " Id at 112.
16. The Court said in Babcock & Wilcox that "when inaccessibility makes inef-
fective the reasonable attempts by nonemployees to communicate with them through
the usual channels, the right to exclude from property has been required to yield to
the extent needed to permit communication of information on the right to organize."
Id.
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consideration. To be sure, the Court in Lechmere said that "[s]o long
as nonemployee union organizers have reasonable access to employ-
ees outside an employer's property, the requisite accommodation has
taken place. It is only where such access is infeasible that it becomes
necessary and proper to ... balanc[e] the employees' and employers'
rights .... 17 Nothing in that language inquiring whether access is
"infeasible" would suggest that the quality of the resulting commu-
nication is relevant.
Later in its decision, however, the Court cited with approval the
Babcock & Wilcox language cited above' s that makes relevant an
inquiry into whether inaccessibility makes "ineffective" efforts to
communicate through normal communication channels. 19 The Court
again emphasized the importance of the effectiveness of the result-
ing communication when it stated that the union does not carry its
burden "by mere conjecture or the expression of doubt concerning
the effectiveness of nontrespassory means of communication. 20 Still
later, the Court said that neither the cumbersomeness of alternative
communication efforts nor that they are "less-than-ideally effec-
tive" will suffice to gain access to employer property. Finally, the
Court advised that "direct contact" . . . is not a necessary element
of "reasonably effective" communication. 21
In short, Lechmere maintains the doctrinal integrity and ambi-
guity of Babcock & Wilcox. It speaks in terms of the feasibility of
the union gaining physical access to those it seeks to inform but also
makes plain that access alone is not determinative: the access must
be such that the resulting communication is effective.
Clarifying Lechmere's continuing commitment to meaningful,
effective communication is important to future applications of the
Babcock & Wilcox/Lechmere doctrine in union organizing contexts.
Clarification also is important in a context not litigated in Lechmere:
consumer picketing and handbilling. When the target of union
communication efforts is an unknown group defined only by their
presence at an employer's place of business to do business with the
employer, the union, of course, cannot use home visits, telephone
calls, and so forth. If the rules set out in Lechmere apply to consumer
picketing and handbilling, then evaluation of whether access to the
target is reasonable must include some evaluation of the effective-
ness of using nontrespassory means of communication to reach
consumers (e.g., newspaper advertisements, picketing on public
spaces, and signs). The Board and the courts may well decide that
17. Lechmere, 112 S Ct at 848.
18. See discussion cited in note 16.
19. Lechmere, 112 S Ct at 848.
20. Id at 848 (emphasis added).
21. Id.
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nontrespassory access to a finite group of employees, such as those
involved in Lechmere, is reasonable because access is literally feasi-
ble and the resulting communication is effective. But the dynamics
of communicating to consumers are quite different. Whether
nontrespassory access to consumers is reasonable (effective) will no
doubt be the subject of heated debate.
II. Internal Union Affairs
Wooddell v IBEW
Right to Jury Trial on LMRDA Cause of Action When Both Legal
and Equitable Relief Sought
White J.: "[A] union member who sues his local union for
money damages under [LMRDA] Title I is entitled to a jury
trial"
LMRA Section 301 Jurisdiction for Union Member to Enforce
Union Constitution in Federal Court
White J.: "The District Court ha[s] jurisdiction [under LMRA
section 301(a)] over the breach of contract suit brought ...
by a union member against his local union."
In Wooddell v IBEW, 2 2 lawyers and others interested in the law
of internal union affairs were treated to the resolution of two press-
ing issues in one opinion. The Court unanimously 23 held that (1) "a
union member who sues his local union for money damages under
Title I of the [LMRDA]24 is entitled to a jury trial," and (2) a "District
Court ha[s] jurisdiction [under LMRA § 301(a)] over the breach of
contract suit brought ... by a union member against his local
union." 25
Both issues arose out of a union member's opposition to an
announced dues increase by IBEW Local 71. The member alleged that
as a result of his opposition, he was discriminated against in the
operation of a hiring hall provided for in the Local 71 collective
bargaining contracts with various electrical contractors. The member
brought an action against the Local in federal court. It alleged a
violation of LMRDA Title I rights; a breach of the international
union's constitution and the Local 71 bylaws, redressable under
LMRA section 301 and state law; a breach of the duty of fair repre-
sentation; and various pendent state law claims. The member sought
22. 112 S Ct 494 (1991).
23. Justice Thomas did not participate.
24. Labor Management Reporting and Disclosure Act of 1959 (LMRDA), 73 Stat
519, as amended, 29 USC § 401 et seq.
25. Wooddell, 112 S Ct at 496.
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equitable relief as well as compensatory and punitive damages and
attorney fees.
The district court dismissed all claims. The court of appeals
reversed the dismissal of the LMRDA Title I free speech claim but
otherwise affirmed the district court, including the court's denial of
a jury trial on the LMRDA claim. 26
The Jury Trial Issue
Two Terms ago, in Teamsters Local 391 v Terry,2 7 the Court
addressed the Seventh Amendment right to a jury trial in a hybrid
breach of contract/breach of the duty of fair representation case.
There, the Court explained that if an action resolves legal rights, the
Seventh Amendment guarantees a right to a jury trial. Courts are to
examine both the nature of the action and the remedy sought and
focus most heavily on the remedy. In Terry, the Court held that
plaintiffs in hybrid actions have a constitutional right to a jury trial.
Since money damages are available in hybrid actions, a traditional
remedy available in the courts of law, and since "the damages sought
were neither analogous to equitable restitutionary relief ... nor inci-
dental to or intertwined with injunctive relief, [the Court in Terry]
concluded that ... the remedy sought was legal."
28
LMRDA Title I actions are closely analogous to personal injury
actions.2 9 The injunctive relief is incidental to the damage claim. And
the back wages cannot fairly be seen as restitutionary incident to a
reinstatement order because "the damages sought are for pay for
jobs to which the union failed to refer [the Member]. ' ' 30 The member
thus was entitled to a jury trial on his LMRDA cause of action.
The Section 301 Issue
In Smith v Evening News,3 ' the Court adopted the now well-
established principle that section 301 suits may be brought by indi-
vidual employees for violation of collective bargaining agreements.
In Plumbers and Pipefitters v Plumbers and Pipefitters, Local 334,32
the Supreme Court stated that section 301 creates federal subject
matter jurisdiction to consider suits alleging breach of an interna-
tional union's constitution. The suit in Plumbers Local 334 was
brought by a local union against its parent international union. Left
unresolved was the issue addressed in Wooddell: whether an indi-
26. Id at 495.
27. 495 US 558 (1990).
28. Wooddell, 112 S Ct at 498.
29. Reed v United Transp Union, 488 US 319, 326-27 (1989).
30. Wooddell, 112 S Ct at 499.
31. 371 US 195 (1962).
32. 452 US 615 (1981).
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vidual union member may bring a section 301 action alleging breach
of the international union constitution, just as Smith had held an
individual employee may sue under section 301 alleging breach of a
collective bargaining agreement.
In Wooddell, the member's theory on the merits was that his
international union's constitution requires all local unions to "live
up to" all collective bargaining agreements.3 The union's discrimi-
nation against him in the enforcement of the hiring hall breached
the collective bargaining agreement and, by extension, breached the
union constitution.
The Court held that the member's suit, alleging a breach of the
union constitution, was a suit alleging a breach of a contract cogni-
zable under section 301 and that a member may bring an action alleg-
ing a breach of that contract.34 A contrary holding would consign
members' suits alleging a breach of a union's constitution to state
court while a similar suit brought by a local union, for example,
would be heard in federal court. That would create the unacceptable
result of international union constitutions having different mean-
ings under state and federal law and different meanings depending
on the identity of the party suing.3 5 This holding raises a host of
issues.
In Textile Workers Union v Lincoln Mills,3 6 the Court held that
enactment of section 301 constituted a congressional invitation for
the federal courts to create a federal common law of collective
bargaining contract enforcement. The decisions in Plumbers Local
334, and now Wooddell, extend that invitation to the creation of a
federal common law of union constitution enforcement. One early
skirmish is likely to be the statute of limitations to apply in Wood-
dell suits.3 7
In Teamsters Local 174 v Lucas Flour Co. ,3 the Supreme Court,
33. Wooddel, 112 S Ct at 499.
34. The Court did not address whether a suit alleging a breach of the local union
by-laws is within the subject matter jurisdiction of section 301. See discussion, Wood-
dell, 112 S Ct at 498 n3. No doubt, the issue will be addressed soon and may turn on
whether the normal international union requirement that local bylaws be approved
by the international union is sufficient to make bylaws a contract between labor
organizations under section 301.
35. Id at 500. The Court was unimpressed with the prediction that permitting
union member section 301 suits would inundate the federal courts with litigation. The
Court noted that such suits have been recognized in the lower courts for years without
any apparent inundation. Id.
36. 353 US 448 (1957).
37. The opening round already has been fought. See Pruitt v Carpenters' Local
225, 893 F2d 1216 (11 th Cir 1990) (state four-year statute of limitations, rather than
the six-month limitations period approved in DelCostello v Teamsters, 462 US 151
(1983), applicable to suit alleging breach of union constitution due to fraudulent
refusal to instate a candidate selected as business representative).
38. 369 US 95 (1962).
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exercising the power conferred by section 301, created the federal
common law rule that when a collective bargaining agreement does
not contain a no-strike clause explicitly, an implied no-strike clause
will be read into a collective bargaining agreement to make effica-
cious the parties' agreement to arbitrate disputes. Given this prec-
edent of federal courts rewriting the parties' section 301 contracts,
will federal courts now begin to read into union constitutions terms
not literally there on the theory that certain implied terms are neces-
sary to make efficacious certain explicit guarantees? 39
Traditionally, union fines have been enforced judicially in state
courts, applying state law. After Wooddell, are suits to enforce union
fines section 301 suits controlled by federal law?40 If yes, then when
the reasonableness of a fine is at issue, Wooddell would seem to make
that a federal substantive issue. Presumably, suits brought in state
court to enforce the terms of a union constitution are removable to
federal court. May a federal court enjoin a union from breaching its
union constitution or is such an injunction barred by the Norris-
LaGuardia Act?
The section 301 preemption implications of Wooddell are inter-
esting to contemplate. The general rule of section 301 preemption is
that section 301 extinguishes state causes of action that require as
an element of proof an interpretation of a contract within the juris-
diction of the federal courts under section 301. When that contract
is a collective bargaining agreement, the rule of Lingle preemption
attaches. 4' By parity of reasoning, section 301 should be found to
preempt any state law claim that depends upon the meaning of a
union constitution. 42 State law claims alleging interference with
contractual relations (the contract referred to being the union
constitution) may well be extinguished by WooddetU. So also would
39. It is true that Lucas Flour is an aberration from the normal federal court
reluctance to rewrite the parties' agreements. Compare H.K. Porter Co. v NLRB, 397
US 99 (1970). Yet, state court precedent offers a model for judicial rewriting of union
constitutions to protect members from perceived arbitrariness. See Summers, The Law
of Union Discipline: What the Courts Do in Fact, 70 Yale L J 175 (1960). The open
question is whether an increasingly conservative federal judiciary will draw from this
state court precedent when called upon to interpret union constitutions.
40. See Joinette v Hotel Employees Local 20, 123 LRRM (BNA) 2159, 2162 (Wash
S Ct 1986). See also Charles Dowd Box Co. v Courtney, 368 US 502 (1962) (state and
federal courts have concurrent jurisdiction to hear section 301 suits (alleging breach
of collective bargaining agreements) but such suits are controlled by federal substan-
tive law).
41. See, for example, Lingle v Norge Div of Magic Chef, Inc., 486 US 399 (1988)
("[I1f the resolution of a state-law claim depends upon the meaning of a collective-
bargaining agreement, the application of state law... is pre-empted and federal labor-
law principles ... must be employed to resolve the dispute.").
42. Accord Pruittv Carpenters Local 225, 893 F2d 1216, 1218-19 (llth Cir 1990)
(state law tort claim by union member alleging fraudulent refusal to instate member
to business representative position preempted by section 301).
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claims of intentional infliction of emotional distress if, in the circum-
stances, resolution should turn on an interpretation of the union
constitution.
Finally, in the hands of an able lawyer, Wooddell offers some
creative opportunities to enforce rights of union members. In Wood-
dell itself, the union constitution was used to bring what was essen-
tially a suit against a local union for breach of the collective
bargaining agreement. But because the action was styled as a breach
of an intra-union contract, plaintiff conveniently avoided the normal
rule that an employee may not sue under the authority of Smith v
Evening News without first exhausting the grievance-arbitration
procedures in the collective bargaining agreement. 43
Promises in union constitutions of democratic procedures, such
as the right to periodic union meetings, the right to have special
meetings called, the right to ratify collective bargaining agreements,
or the right to have a strike vote conducted are all now promises
enforceable in federal court. So now are eligibility standards set forth
in union constitutions to vote or be nominated for union office.
Wooddell suits already have been brought against union officers to
enforce officer's obligations found in the constitution. 4 4 In short,
Wooddell soon will become a mainstay of the multicount complaint
that the union bar has come to expect when unions are sued in
controversies arising out of internal union disputes.
III. Employment Discrimination
A. Title VII
United States v Burke
Internal Revenue Code § 104(a)(2)-Treatment of Title VII Back
Pay Settlements as Income
Blackmun J.: "[Wle cannot say that a statute such as Title VII
whose sole remedial focus is the award of backwages,
redresses a tort-like personal injury within the meaning of
[section] 104(a)(2)...."
In United States v Burke,4 5 the Court decided an important issue
regarding the tax treatment of settlement payments of back pay
claims under Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act. Resolving a
conflict among the Circuits, the Court held (7-2) that such payments
are not excludable from the recipient's gross income pursuant to
section 104(a)(2) of the Internal Revenue Code.46
43. See, for example, Republic Steel Corp. v Maddox, 379 US 650 (1965). Compare
Groves v Ring Screw Works,__ US -, 111 S Ct 498 (1990).
44. See, for example, Shea v McCarthy, 953 F2d 29 (2d Cir 1992).
45. Burke, 112 S Ct 1867 (1992).
46. 26 USC § 104(a)(2). That section provides that "damages received ... on
account of personal injuries" are excludable from gross income.
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This case arose out of a gender discrimination suit alleging that
the employer, the Tennessee Valley Authority (TVA), violated Title
VII when it increased salaries of male-dominated pay schedules but
not those of female-dominated pay schedules. Settlement was
reached. TVA agreed to pay $5 million to the affected employees. It
withheld from them federal income taxes on the amounts allocated
to each. The affected employees filed refund claims with the Inter-
nal Revenue Service (IRS) which disallowed the claims. In a refund
action brought in federal district court, the court concluded that
settlement payments do not constitute section 104(a)(2) excludable
income because the affected employees sought and obtained only
back wages due them as a result of the discrimination they alleged.
The Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals, by divided vote, reversed. The
court of appeals reasoned that the determinative consideration is
whether the injury and claim are "personal and tort-like in nature. '47
The Court held that the employees' gender discrimination claim
constituted a personal, tort-like injury, rejecting the government's
argument that a contrary conclusion should be reached because Title
VII did not then authorize compensatory or punitive damages.48 The
statutory construction issue was whether the settlement recovery
was for "personal injuries" within the meaning of that phrase in
section 104(a)(2).
The Supreme Court majority agreed that section 104(a)(2) is
limited to a recovery based on tort or tort-type rights. The majority
concluded, however, that the remedies available in any given case
fix the character of the right that is asserted. Tort or tort-type rights
are those whose invasion a court will remedy through a broad range
of damages. Tort damages go beyond compensation to reimburse for
actual monetary loss and include redress for "intangible elements of
injury ' 49 such as emotional distress and pain and suffering.
Title VII, the majority held, does not provide a remedy for a tort-
like injury because Title VII provides only for injunctive relief, back
pay, and other equitable relief. It does not provide for compensatory
or punitive damages. Simply put, Title VII does not constitute a
"personal injury" because the cause of action it creates does not
"evidence[] a tort-like conception of injury and remedy." 50
47. 929 F2d 1119, 1121 (1991).
48. Id at 1123.
49. Burke, 112 S Ct 1867 (1992).
50. Id at 1873. Justice Scalia concurred in the result but on much narrower grounds.
In his view, a "personal injury" within the meaning of that term in section 104(a)(2)
is limited to physical injuries to the person (possibly also including injury to one's
mental health), thus excluding injury to dignity or nonphysical torts such as defa-
mation. Under this view, only a Title VII discriminatee's recovery for psychological
harm would constitute excludable income. Back pay, of course, would not.
Justice Souter also concurred. He argued that Title VII rights parallel many tort
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Burke promises to complicate, and make more expensive, Title
VII settlements. Plaintiffs can be expected to discount settlement
offers by the taxes that will be deducted and, therefore, demand
more. They may end up having to accept less.
The Court in Burke acknowledged that in 1991 Congress
amended Title VII to permit recovery of compensatory and punitive
damages by victims of intentional discrimination. 51 The tax treat-
ment of back pay will remain unaffected by this development and
the 1989 amendment to section 104(a)(2) precludes excluding puni-
tive damages from gross income except for physical injury. Three
issues come to mind.
First, Burke did not address whether a back pay recovery
constitutes "wages" subject to taxation for Federal Insurance
Compensation Act (FICA) purposes. This issue was recognized by
the Court but explicitly avoided as neither party nor any court below
had addressed it.52
Second, tax lawyers (as well as the IRS and the courts) have yet
to resolve whether all compensatory damages constitute excludable
income or only those compensating for physical injury and harm to
mental health. The language of section 104(a)(2) is "personal injury
or sickness." Burke decided only that this term does not include back
pay. It did not consider the point Justice Scalia argued, that section
104(a)(2) excludes compensatory damages only for invasions of
personal interests that harm a victim's physical or mental health.
That view could strip section 104(a)(2) protection from recoveries
for invasion of intangible elements of injury such as emotional
distress, degradation, defamation, and pain and suffering. 53
Finally, since back pay and punitive damages are not excludable
but compensatory damages are, their mix in a settlement will have
significant tax consequences. The structure of the claim and its
settlement, accordingly, will be important. The IRS cannot be
expected to accept that a claim for back pay and compensatory and
rights such as those at stake in a defamation action: both vindicate "an interest in
dignity as a human being entitled to be judged on individual merit." Id at 1877-78
(Souter concurring). Yet the remedy here is very nontort-like: "Back pay ... is quin-
tessentially a contractual measure of damages." Id. On close questions, Justice Souter
concluded, the taxpayer loses since income should not be deemed excluded "unless
some provision of the Internal Revenue Code clearly so entails." Id.
Dissenting, Justice O'Connor (joined by Justice Thomas) viewed the Title VII cause
of action as a tort-like right. Functionally, Title VII operates like a tort right with an
"award [of] compensation for invasions of a right to be free from certain injury in the
workplace." Id at 1879 (O'Connor dissenting). In addition, Title VII, like tort rights,
vindicates certain preferred public purposes beyond offsetting specific losses.
51. Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub L 102-166, 105 Stat 1073.
52. Burke, at 1869 nl.
53. The IRS and the Tax Court seem to disagree with Justice Scalia's view of the
sweep of section 104(a)(2). See Thelkeld v Commissioner, 87 T C # 76, aff'd, 348 F2d
81 (6th Cir 1988).
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punitive damages was settled solely for compensatory damages. How
convenient for the taxpayer. Reasonably, the IRS will look to the
claim that was settled to allocate the settlement. Hence, how the
claim was structured originally may prove important. At least, some
thought of the tax consequences of the claim may well-serve our
clients.
One closing thought. None of Burke ultimately may make any
sense. To say that back pay is not excludable but compensatory
damages are is to treat similar things differently. As any lawyer
knows, often the critical factor in computing compensatory damages
is reduced earning capacity. Why is that excludable but back pay




Liability of Public Officials Sued in Their Individual Capacities
for Performing Official Duties
O'Connor J.: "[Sltate officials, sued in their individual capac-
ities, are 'persons' within the meaning of [section] 1983. The
Eleventh Amendment does not bar such suits, nor are state
officers absolutely immune from personal liability under
[section] 1983 by virtue of the 'official' nature of their acts."
In 1989, the Court decided that a state is not a "person" as that
term is used in section 1983. 5 4 Accordingly, it is not suable under
that statute regardless of the forum in which the suit is maintained.
Suits for damages against state officials "acting in their official
capacities" are deemed suits against the state and, therefore, they
also cannot be brought under section 1983. 55 Hafer v Melo56 consid-
ered whether it thus follows that section 1983 excludes all suits
against state officers for damages arising from official acts-includ-
ing personal-capacity suits. The Court unanimously held that such
a conclusion does not follow. State officials sued in their personal
capacities are "persons" for purposes of section 1983 even if the
alleged injury arose from actions taken in their official capacities.
Hafer, the newly elected Pennsylvania Auditor General,
dismissed eighteen employees from their jobs in her office, allegedly
54. 42 USC § 1983.
55. Will v Michigan Dep't of State Police, 491 US 58 (1989). "[A] state official in
his or her official capacity, when sued for injunctive relief, would be a person under
[section] 1983 because 'official-capacity actions for prospective relief are not treated
as actions against the state.' " Id at 71 nl0 (quoting Kentucky v Graham, 473 US 159,
167 n14 (1985).
56. 112 S Ct 358 (1991).
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in fulfillment of a campaign promise. They sued her under section
1983 raising a variety of claims, including that at least some had
been discharged because of their political affiliation and support for
her opponent in the election. Among the remedies sought were mone-
tary damages. The district court dismissed all claims because under
the Supreme Court's Will decision, "she could not be held liable for
employment decisions made in her official capacity as Auditor
General." 57
The Third Circuit Court of Appeals reversed. 58 The circuit court
held that in Will the Supreme Court had held that state officials sued
for injunctive relief in their official capacities are "persons" subject
to section 1983 liability.59 As to the claims for monetary relief, the
court of appeals held that plaintiffs had sued Hafer in her individual
capacity for injuries arising from her official acts. This, the court of
appeals held, made out a claim for relief under section 1983. The
issue thus raised was whether section 1983 creates a cause of action
for individual-capacity damage suits against state officials for actions
taken under color of state law.
In Hafer, the Court reaffirmed its holding in Will that "[N]either
a State nor its officials acting in their official capacities are 'persons'
under [section] 1983."60 But, as the Court explained in Hafer, "the
phrase 'acting in their official capacities' is best understood as a
reference to the capacity in which the state officer is sued, not the
capacity in which the officer inflicts the alleged injury." 61
A contrary conclusion, that state officials may not be held liable
in their personal capacity for actions they take in their official
capacity, would, in effect, absolutely immunize state officials from
personal liability under section 1983. Yet, the Court has granted
absolute immunity to only a very small class of public officials: the
President of the United States, legislators carrying out their legis-
lative functions, and judges carrying out their judicial functions.
"State executive officials are not entitled to absolute immunity for
their official actions. '62
The Court states that the distinction between official- and
personal-capacity suits is "more than a pleading device. '63 It is a
57. See description of the district court's rationale recited by the Court in Hafer,
112 S Ct 358 (1991).
58. 912 F2d 628 (3d Cir 1990).
59. See discussion cited in note 55.
60. Hafer, 112 S Ct at 362 (quoting Will v Michigan Dep't of State Police, 491 US
58, 71 (1989)).
61. Id.
62. See id. The Court also held that personal-capacity suits under section 1983
may be brought in federal court. No Eleventh Amendment bar attaches because in
such suits the state is not the real party in interest: Damages are not sought from the
public treasury but from the individual defendant. Id at 364.
63. Id at 362.
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distinction of substance. That is the core holding of Hafer. Yet, the
case presents a ringing pleading lesson every lawyer needs to learn.
This case was a consolidation of two suits. In one, the plaintiffs
expressly sought damages from Hafer in her official capacity. In the
other, they did not, but the court of appeals held that plaintiffs
implicitly "signified a similar intent. ' 6 4 In a footnote, the Supreme
Court noted that the circuits are split regarding whether in section
1983 damage actions the pleadings must explicitly state that the
action is brought against the state official in his or her personal
capacity. 65 The issue was not before the Court in Hafer. So it lingers
unresolved. The pleading lesson is clear.
Finally, state officials sued in their personal capacities may
assert personal immunity defenses, "such as objectively reasonable
reliance on existing law. '66 Now that the Court has made plain that
state officials may be sued in their personal capacity for actions
taken in their official capacity, I suspect the courts will be deluged
with creative pleas from state officials to expand the scope of
personal immunity defenses. The Court in Hafer signaled as much.
It stated: "To be sure, imposing personal liability on state officers
may hamper their performance of public duties. But such concerns
are properly addressed within the framework of our personal immu-
nity jurisprudence. ' 6 7 The Court seldom more clearly telegraphs an
invitation for creative lawyering.
C. Title IX
Franklin v Gwinnett County Public Schools
Availability of a Damage Remedy in Action Brought under Title
IX of the Education Amendments of 1972
White J.: "[Although we examine the text and history of a
statute to determine whether Congress intended to create a
right of action,... we presume the availability of all appro-
priate remedies unless Congress has expressly indicated
otherwise."
In Canon v University of Chicago,68 the Court held that Title IX
is enforceable through an implied private right of action. Franklin
v awinnett County Public Schools69 addressed the important ques-
tion of what remedies are available in a suit brought pursuant to
this implied right of action. Specifically, the issue was whether only
64. 912 F2d at 636.
65. Hafer, 112 S Ct at 362 n *
66. Id at 364.
67. Id at 362.
68. 441 US 677 (1979).
69. 112 S Ct 1028 (1992).
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equitable relief such as injunctive relief and back pay is available
or whether compensatory and punitive damages also are available.
In Franklin, the Court held unanimously that Title IX relief is not
limited to equitable remedies.
The issue arose in a gender discrimination suit brought by a
student of a public high school who alleged she had been continually
sexually harassed by a faculty member who was her sports coach
and teacher. The alleged harassment consisted of sexually oriented
conversations probing into the student's sexual experiences, forcible
kisses, telephone calls to her home requesting that she agree to meet
the teacher socially, and three episodes of coercive intercourse. The
student further alleged that teachers and administrators at her high
school were aware of the allegations but initiated no action to halt
the teacher's behavior and discouraged the student from pressing
charges against the teacher. The student sought damages in a Title
IX action alleging sex discrimination.
The district court dismissed the action on the ground that Title
IX does not authorize damage awards. The Eleventh Circuit Court
of Appeals affirmed.7 0 Among other arguments, the court of appeals
reasoned that Title IX was enacted pursuant to Congress' Spending
Clause power and, therefore, relief "frequently [is] limited to that
which is equitable in nature, with the recipient of federal funds thus
retaining the option of terminating such receipt in order to rid itself
of an injunction. 7 1 In addition, the circuit court argued no damage
relief may be found absent express provision by Congress.
The Supreme Court noted a split in the circuits on this point. It
observed that its modern precedent does require an explicit mani-
festation by Congress of an intent to create a private right of action-
usually found by examining the text and history of a statute. But a
private right of action having been found, the presumption is that
all appropriate remedies are then available "unless Congress has
expressly indicated otherwise. 7 2 In short, the availability of a right
of action and the relief afforded under it are, analytically, very
different questions. The Court viewed the basis for this difference
as residing in important separation of powers values in our consti-
tutional system. Congress has the primary responsibility to create
rights of action. The Court has the primary responsibility to remedy
invasions of those rights. Limitations on the courts' traditional
remedial authority will not be presumed. Congress must make clear
its intent to limit that authority. 73 When "Congress is silent on the
question of remedies, a federal court may order any appropriate
70. 911 F2d 617 (11th Cir 1990).
71. Franklin, 911 F2d at 621.
72. Franklin, 112 S Ct at 1032.
73. Id at 1032-34.
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relief. '74 Here, neither the text nor the history of Title IX revealed
a congressional intent to limit available damages.7 5 Thus, the normal
remedies of monetary damages are available in Title IX actions.76
This case is of great importance in Title IX employment discrim-
ination litigation, especially since in Franklin, the majority cited
Meritor Savings Bank, FSB v Vinson7 7 as applicable to Title IX
actions: "[Wjhen a supervisor sexually harasses a subordinate
because of the subordinate's sex, that supervisor 'discriminates' on
the basis of sex." 78
Otherwise, however, the case is likely to have limited impact.
When Congress explicitly creates a right of action it normally also
delineates the available remedies. The holding in Franklin is impor-
tant when the courts find an implied right of action and the statute
predictably is silent as to remedy. But, for the near future, it is
unlikely that many implied rights of action will be found by this
Court.79
One final point, this case is interesting for its subtext. The Court
seems implicitly to be saying that it is not prepared to take the heat
for the existence of a right without an adequate remedy. If Congress
desires to limit remedy, let it do so and be accountable. The Court is
institutionally ill-equipped to suffer the public opprobrium of such
an outcome. The Court will not "abdicate [its] historic judicial
authority to award appropriate relief in cases brought in our court
system."8 0
Moreover, from a separation of powers viewpoint, to deny plain-
74. Id at 1034. Whether damages against the state may be obtained in a federal
court raises yet another question-one that arises because of the Eleventh Amend-
ment and the state sovereign immunity values in our constitutional system. That issue
did not arise in this case because the Court has held that Congress has abrogated the
states' sovereign immunity rights in the Civil Rights Equalization Amendments of
1986, 42 USC § 2000d-7.
75. That Title IX was enacted pursuant to Congress' Spending Clause power is
significant but only to the extent that no damage remedy will be presumed for unin-
tentional violations. See Pennhurst State School and Hospital v Halderman, 451 US
1, 28-29 (1981). The federal courts reserve their normal authority to remedy inten-
tional violations by means of all appropriate remedies.
76. Justice Scalia (with the Chief Justice and Justice Thomas) concurred. He
argued that the normal presumption that judicial power exists to provide all appro-
priate remedies should not attach when the right of action is implied. In such cases,
Congress will always remain silent regarding remedies available in suits it never
expressly considered. But here, congressional action subsequent to the Court's 1979
finding of an implied right of action in Title IX suits convinced the concurring judges
that Congress intended that Title IX provides a remedy for monetary damages.
77. 477 US 57 (1986).
78. Id at 64.
79. See Karahalios v National Federation of Federal Employees, 489 US 527
(1989) (no implied right of action for federal employee to enforce a statutory right
of fair representation); See also Touche Ross & Co. v Redington, 442 US 560, 575-76
(1979); Transamerica Mortgage Advisors, Inc. v Lewis, 444 US 11, 18, 23-24 (1979).
80. Franklin, 112 S Ct at 1037.
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tiffs an adequate remedy in the face of congressional silence as to
remedy risks eviscerating the right created. For those who followed
the Court's disassembly of our civil rights statutes during the Court's
1988 Term, it may seem strange to argue that the Court would
concern itself with undermining the efficacy of another federal civil
rights law.8 ' But, the combination of the 1987 Civil Rights Restora-
tion Act,8 2 which reversed the effect of Grove City College v Bell.8 3
and the recently enacted 1991 Civil Rights Act.8 4 which reversed the
effect of seven of the Court's civil rights rulings, cannot have gone
unnoticed by the court. These legislative responses to the judicial
nullification of federal civil rights law may have had a salutary effect
on the Court. Certainly, there is a limit to how often the Court, a




Fee Enhancement for Contingency Fee Cases under Federal Fee-
Shifting Statutes
Scalia J.: "Contingency enhancement is... not consistent with
our general rejection of the contingent-fee model for fee
awards nor is it necessary to the determination of a reason-
able fee."
Meaningful enforcement of the nation's civil rights laws (and
environmental laws) depends on competent legal representation.
Recognizing this, Congress has authorized fee awards for prevailing
parties in much of this litigation. Also known as fee-shifting provi-
sions, this legislation is necessary because plaintiffs often have
insufficient resources to retain counsel and the litigation typically
generates too small a recovery to be shared with attorneys to justify
a standard contingent fee arrangement. "The strategy of the fee-
shifting provisions is to attract competent counsel to selected federal
cases by ensuring that if they prevail, counsel will receive fees
commensurable with what they could obtain in other litigation. '85
Burlington v Dague8 6 considered the issue of whether the award
of attorney fees under federal fee-shifting statutes may factor in
contingency, the risk of nonpayment due to not prevailing in the
81. See generally Murphy, The 1988-89 Supreme Court Labor and Employment
Law Term, presented to the ABA Labor and Employment Law Section, Aug 7, 1989,
reprinted in 131 Lab Rel Rep (BNA) 530 (Aug 21, 1989).
82. Pub L 100-259, 102 Stat 28 (1988).
83. 465 US 555 (1984).
84. Pub L 102-166, 105 Stat 1071.
85. Burlington v Dague, 112 S Ct 2638, 2644 (1992) (Blackmun dissenting).
86. Id at 2638.
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case.87 The majority held (6-3) that contingency already is a factor
in the traditional "lodestar" formula used to compute attorney fees
but contingency otherwise is not an appropriate consideration.
The identical issue was before the Court in 1987 in Pennsyl-
vania v Delaware Valley Citizens' Council for Clean Air (Delaware
Valley II), but the Court then was unable to muster a majority
rationale.88 There four members of the Court held that fee enhance-
ment to reflect contingent risk of nonpayment was never author-
ized,8 9 four justices argued that enhancement for contingency is
always statutorily required, 90 and Justice O'Connor argued that
consideration of contingency is permitted when "the applicant can
establish that without an adjustment for risk the prevailing party
would have faced substantial difficulties in finding counsel in the
local or other relevant market." 9' Since Delaware Valley II, of course,
Justices Brennan and Marshall have been replaced by Justices Souter
and Thomas.
Under the "lodestar" formula, the majority in Burlington
reasoned, contingency already is a factor. Contingent risk arises, in
part, from the difficulty of establishing the merits. The "lodestar"
considers this "either in the higher number of hours expended to
overcome the difficulty, or in the higher hourly rate of the attorney
skilled and experienced enough to do so."92 Endorsement of contin-
gency enhancement thus creates the risk of duplication of compen-
sation.9 3 The other factor contributing to contingency, the legal and
factual merits of the claim, is not reflected in the "lodestar." Nor
should it be, the majority argued: otherwise "attorneys [would have]
the same incentive to bring meritless claims as relatively meritori-
ous ones. 
94
Nor was the majority willing to find statutory authorization for
contingency enhancement if the applicant can establish that without
it, the prevailing party would have faced substantial difficulties
obtaining counsel. Such an approach was seen as essentially an exer-
cise in judging the risk in the particular case in which the party
prevailed because the relative lack of merits of a particular case was
seen to be the predominant reason why counsel would be unavail-
87. While this case arose under a fee-shifting provision contained in the Federal
Water Control Act, its reasoning applies to fee-shifting provisions in Title VII of the
1964 Civil Rights Act, the Age Discrimination in Employment Act, and the Civil Rights
Attorney Fees Act. Id at 2639.
88. Pennsylvania v Delaware Valley Citizens' Councilfor Clean Air, 483 US 711
(1987) (Delaware Valley II).
89. Id at 723-27.
90. Id at 737-42, 754.
91. Id at 733.
92. Burlington, 112 S Ct at 2641.
93. Id.
94. Id.
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able absent substantial economic incentive. This, the Court was
unwilling to endorse.
In addition, the majority concluded that contingency enhance-
ment would, in effect, provide compensation for meritless litigation,
contrary to the command of fee-shifting statutes that provide reim-
bursement only to prevailing parties. The majority reasoned that
"[an attorney operating on a contingency-fee basis pools the risks
presented by his various cases: cases that turn out to be successful
pay for the time he gambled on those that did not. To award a
contingency enhancement. .. would in effect pay for the attorney's
time ... in cases where his client does not prevail.95
Finally, the majority argued that contingency enhancement is
not necessary to the determination of a reasonable fee because "the
lodestar model often (perhaps generally) results in a larger fee award
than the contingent-fee model. ' ' 96 Moreover, its adoption would
render "the setting of fees more complex and arbitrary, hence more
unpredictable, and hence more litigable. ' '97
Writing for the dissent, Justice Blackmun argued that the effect
of the majority opinion will be that the expected return from cases
brought under federal fee-shifting statutes will be less than those
brought in otherwise comparable private litigation. As a result, he
argued, "[pirudent counsel [will] tend to avoid federal fee-bearing
claims in favor of private litigation, even in the very situations for
which the attorney fee statutes are designed. This will be true even
if the fee-bearing claim is more likely meritorious than the compet-
ing private claim."98 After addressing each of the majority's argu-
ments, Justice Blackmun argued that we can expect now that many
meritorious claims will not be filed or, if filed, will be prosecuted by
less experienced and able counsel-most notably civil rights and
environmental cases. 99
Eliminating the analytical ornamentation from the majority and
dissenting opinions, the issue in Burlington remains whether a
contingency enhancement is necessary to attract competent counsel
to litigate claims in the selected federal statutes containing fee-
shifting provisions. The majority and dissent view reality diamet-
rically differently. The majority invites lawyers to expend (and add
95. Id (emphasis in the original).
96. Id (citing the Report of the Federal Courts Study Commission 104 (Apr 2,
1990)).
97. Id.
98. Id at 2645 (Blackmun dissenting).
99. Justice O'Connor filed a separate dissenting opinion. She reiterated her belief
that federal fee-shifting statutes command that the fees awarded should be sufficient
to attract competent counsel. In some markets, she argued, "this must include the
assurance of a contingency enhancement if the plaintiff should prevail." Id at 2648
(O'Connor dissenting).
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to their "lodestar" calculation) a higher number of hours to over-
come the difficulty of establishing the merits in complex cases. The
majority additionally offers the possibility of the award of a higher
hourly rate, commensurate with that paid an attorney "skilled and
experienced enough" to prove the merits of a difficult case.100 District
court judges, accordingly, are invited to approve as reasonable a
higher number of billable hours and a higher hourly rate to reflect
the time and skill needed to overcome the difficulty of prevailing in
cases having a high loss risk due to the difficulty of proving the
merits. Whether, and if so to what degree, the contingency of liti-
gation is so factored into the lodestar will likely determine whether
the majority's or the dissent's view of reality proves more accurate.
IV. Employee Safety and Health
Constitutional Protection
Collins v Harker Heights, Texas
Constitutional Protection against a Municipality's Custom and
Practice of Deliberate Indifference Toward Workplace Safety
Stevens J.: "Neither the text nor the history of the Due Proc-
ess Clause supports petitioner's claim that a governmental
employer's duty to provide its employees with a safe working
environment is a substantive component of the Due Process
Clause."
In Collins v Harker Heights,'0' the surviving spouse of a deceased
municipal employee asked the Supreme Court to determine whether
a municipality violates the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment when it maintains a custom and policy of deliberate
indifference toward the safety of its employees, by not providing
the training and equipment necessary to preserve their workplace
safety, when this custom and policy results in the death of the
employee.
Larry Michael Collins, a municipal sanitation worker, lost his
life in the course of his employment. Ordered to enter a manhole to
unstop a sewer line, Larry Collins died of asphyxia. He died because
his employer, Harker Heights, Texas, had a "custom and policy of
deliberate indifference toward the safety of its employees."'' 0 2 The
municipality, on notice of the risks of entering sewer lines, "syste-
matically and intentionally failed to provide the equipment and
training required by Texas statute."' 0 3
100. Id at 2641.
101. 112 S Ct 1061 (1992).
102. Id at 1064.
103. Such were the allegations in the complaint filed by the deceased employee's
widow, allegations the Court considered true for the purposes of its decision. See id.
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The deceased employee's widow raised the constitutional issue
by means of a section 1983 action. 10 4 To prevail, plaintiff was
required to demonstrate (1) that her spouse died as a result of a
constitutional violation-that a constitutional tort had been
committed, and (2) that the municipality was responsible for that
violation. 05 The Court held that causation had been proved, but that
the municipality's deliberate indifference to the deceased employ-
ee's safety did not violate constitutional rights.
As to the proof of causation, the Court, relying on previous cases,
concluded that the constitutional deprivation must have been caused
by "official municipal policy [or] government's ... custom." Proof
that government employed a constitutional tort-feasor is insuffi-
cient. "[In other words, a municipality cannot be held liable under
[section] 1983 on a respondeat superior theory."10 6 A failure to train
municipal employees will satisfy the requirement that there be a
causal link between a constitutional tort and some municipal policy
or custom if the failure to train amounts to "'deliberate indifference'
to the rights of persons with whom the [municipal agents] come into
contact.o107
In this case, the deceased employee's widow alleged the muni-
cipality's "deliberate indifference toward the safety of its employ-
ees." 10 8 That satisfied the "threshold for holding a city responsible
for the constitutional torts committed by its inadequately trained
104. 42 USC § 1983.
105. Collins, 112 S Ct at 1065. See Oklahoma City v Tuttle, 471 US 808, 817
(1985) (opinion of Rehnquist); Id at 828-29 (opinion of Brennan concurring in part
and concurring in judgment).
The Court rejected a third requirement imposed by the Fifth Circuit Court of
Appeals-that plaintiff also must demonstrate an "abuse of governmental power
separate and apart from the proof of a constitutional violation." See Collins, 112 S
Ct at 1063. The Circuit Court had affixed this additional proof requirement because
the civil rights suit was brought by a public employee. Id. See Myra Jo Collins v City
of Harker Heights, Texas, 916 F2d 284, 287-88 and n3 (5th Cir 1990). The Supreme
Court held that "the statute [section 1983] does not draw any distinction between
abusive and nonabusive federal violations [and] the employment relationship ... is
not of controlling significance. [The] provisions of the Federal Constitution afford
protection to employees who serve the government as well as those who are served
by them, and [section] 1983 provides a cause of action for all citizens injured by an
abridgement of those protections." Collins, 112 S Ct at 1066.
106. Collins, 112 S Ct at 1066. Compare Oklahoma City v Tuttle, 471 US 808
(1985) (Wrongful conduct by single police officer with no policymaking authority does
not establish municipal liability); Pembaur v Cincinnati, 475 US 469, 483-84 (1986)
(county responsible for unconstitutional conduct of county prosecutor and county
sheriff because they were the "officials responsible for establishing final policy with
respect to the subject matter in question"). See also Monell v New York City Dep't of
Social Services, 436 US 658,694-95 (1978) (neither vicarious liability nor respondeat
superior will attach under section 1983).
107. Id at 1068. See Canton v Harris, 489 US 378, 388 (1989) (receipt of neces-
sary medical attention while in police custody).
108. Id at 1064.
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agents."'' 0 1 Plaintiff's case was dismissed notwithstanding, for the
complaint did not allege a constitutional violation.
Plaintiff's constitutional theory was that an employee is
deprived due process of law (substantive due process) when a
municipality by "custom and policy of deliberate indifference toward
the safety of its employees [and on notice of the hazards to which
employees are exposed] systematically and intentionally fail[s] to
provide the equipment and training required [to protect employee
lives]." 10
The Court disagreed. In an exercise of judicial group therapy,
the Court acknowledged that the true grounds for decision turn on
fundamental choices: (1) about the Court's own institutional compe-
tence to federalize (constitutionalize) a ban on a local government's
disregard for its worker's safety and health; (2) about the intersec-
tion of the majoritarian political process with individual rights
enshrined in the Constitution; and (3) about changing the power
balances between Washington and the states. Implicitly, the case also
is about changing the power relationships between public employees
and their employers.
First, citing the need to exercise "judicial self-restraint" "in this
unchartered area" where "guideposts for responsible decisionmak-
ing are scarce and open-ended," the Court held that "[n]either the
text nor the history of the Due Process Clause supports petitioner's
claim that a governmental employer's duty to provide its employees
with a safe working environment is a substantive component of the
Due Process Clause.""' The unanimous Court reasoned that due
process is a guarantee that government will not exercise its various
powers "as an instrument of oppression" to deprive persons of life,
liberty, or property without due process of law. The due process
clause does not guarantee " 'certain minimal levels of safety and
security [or otherwise] impose an affirmative obligation on the state
to ensure that [life, liberty or property] do not come to harm through
other means.' 1112
109. Id at 1068.
110. Id at 1064.
111. Id at 1069.
112. Id (citing DeShaney v Winnebago County Dep't of Social Services, 489 US
189, 196 (1989)). It is, of course, absurd to argue that the text of the due process
clause does not support the claim. It never does in any substantive due process case.
As to the history of due process clause, clearly the social contract's terms it enshrines
never granted government the right to act arbitrarily or capriciously. To conclude no
capriciousness here by mere assertion is clumsy.
The Court observed that the complaint never alleged willful or deliberate harm
to the deceased by the city or any of its agents. Id. This observation raises the sugges-
tion that a policy or practice of willful or deliberate harm to employees implicates
substantive due process rights but "deliberate indifference" to employee safety does
not. The difference seems to be one of subjective intent. If it could be shown the
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The Court distinguished this case from cases involving the right
to minimum safety standards of persons who are in custody (already
deprived of liberty by government). There, the "process" due
"includes a continuing obligation [by government] to satisfy certain
minimal custodial standards."11 3 Here, the Court envisioned the
deceased as a volunteer: he accepted an offer of employment and
had the freedom to leave that employment at will." 4
One wonders whether Larry Collins, the sewer worker who
cleared clogged sewers for a living, considered himself a volunteer.
Or was he in economic custody, an economic detainee with a detai-
nee's normal entitlement to the benefit of government's "continuing
obligation to satisfy certain minimal custodial standards."' 1 5
Acknowledging the deceased as economically trapped would have
been monumental, unprecedented, and, probably, institutionally
impossible. How many others in the society also are trapped as
economic detainees? Might they also not make constitutional claims
on the public coffers as they seek relief from their hunger, home-
lessness, and ill-health? In our constitutional system, the vicissi-
tudes attendant to a hard life are not of constitutional moment. Plus,
one is pressed to ask whether the Court did not also have institu-
tional concerns about creating false hopes, should it assume respon-
sibility to " 'regulate liability for injuries that attend living together
in society.' ,116 Putting false promises in the Constitution is risky
business." 7
Addressing plaintiff's alternative argument, the Court stated
that a custom and policy of deliberate indifference toward the safety
of a municipality's employees cannot "properly be characterized as
arbitrary, or conscience-shocking in a constitutional sense" and for
that independent reason constitute a violation of due process." 8 The
supervisor knew that entering a manhole without breathing equipment meant instant
death, why should the law not acknowledge that sending a worker to such a death is
a willful and deliberate act?
113. Id at 1070. See, for example, Turner v Safley, 482 US 78, 94-99 (1987)
(convicted felons); Revere v Massachusetts General Hospital, 463 US 239, 244-45
(1983) (persons under arrest); Youngberg v Romeo, 457 US 307, 315-16 (1982) (persons




116. Id (citing Daniels v Wiltiams, 474 US 327, 332 (1986)).
117. Professor Walter Dellinger, of Duke University, argues that
[I]t would be wonderful if we could simply declare by constitutional amend-
ment that henceforth the air would be clean, the streets free of drugs and the
budget forever in balance. But merely saying those things in the Constitution
does not make them happen. Putting false promises in the Constitution is not
a trivial matter. It breeds disrespect for the rule of law.
Eric Pianin, A Balanced Budget Amendment: The Dream and the Debate, Washington
Post A17 (June 2, 1992) (speaking about the balanced budget amendment).
118. Collins, 112 S Ct at 1070.
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Court recited numerous reasons. They are worth examination as they
expose other concerns of the Court, particularly concerns over
changing the balance of power between Washington and the states
and the interaction of representative government and the right of
individuals to impose themselves on the majority.
The Court saw in the death of this worker nothing more than a
"fairly typical" state law tort claim. The due process clause, the
Court reasoned, " 'does not purport to supplant traditional tort law
in laying down rules of conduct to regulate liability for injuries that
attend living together in society.' "I'9 Limiting the scope of due proc-
ess clause protection is especially compelling, the Court argued, when
claims are asserted against public employers because state law,
rather than the federal Constitution, generally governs the substance
of that employment relationship.12 0
Beyond traditions of local governance of tort claims and establish-
ing municipal labor relations policy, the death of Larry Michael Collins
summons for the Court concerns about the accommodation of what it
describes as questions of "allocation of resources" and "the competing
social, political, and economic forces" implicated by " 'incorrect or ill-
advised personnel decisions.' "121 The Court believes that elected bod-
ies have the responsibility to make such accommodations through what
the Court considers the "rational decisionmaking process" of the po-
litical branches of government. These decisions are not to be made by
judges interpreting the Constitution. 122
The Court is unwilling to be the instrument that shifts new costs
on to the states, preferring that "locally elected representatives"
should resolve the "host of policy choices that must be made" in-
cluding "[d]ecisions about allocation of resources to individual pro-
grams, such as sewer maintenance, and to particular aspects of those
programs, such as the training and compensation of
employees .... ",123
A differently configured Supreme Court rationally could have
resolved the power allocation issues surrounding the Collins case
differently. It would be necessary to view this case as about more
than "ill-advised" personnel policies and the allocation of scarce re-
sources and see it as about the right to life. To be sure, sewer work-
ers throughout the United States would be empowered at the expense
of their government employers. So also would tens of thousands of
other public employees.
Probably no Supreme Court in the history of the Republic ever
119. Id (citing Daniels v Williams, 474 US 327, 332 (1986)).
120. Id.
121. Id (citing Bishop v Wood, 426 US 341, 350 (1976)).
122. Id.
123. Id.
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had the will or the power necessary to reconfigure the constitutional
values as would have been necessary to grant the plaintiff a victory
in this case. For here the plaintiff sought judicial regulation of work
place standards, seriously testing the judiciary's institutional com-
petence to craft solutions and the political branches' willingness to
tolerate interference. 124 Compared to Larry Michael Collins's widow,
Don Quixote was a realist. But some, holdovers from the 1960s, might
see the effort as ennobling.
B. OSHA
Gade v National Solid Wastes Management Ass'n
Section 18(b)-State's Obligation to Submit State Plan before
Licensing Certain Occupations
O'Connor J.: "[OSHA] pre-empts all [nonapproved] state 'occu-
pational safety and health standards relating to any occu-
pational safety and health issue with respect to which a
federal standard has been promulgated.'"
In its first Occupational Safety and Health Act (OSHA) preemp-
tion case, the Court upheld OSHA's strong preemptive power over
state licensing laws and, implicitly, over a wide range of other state
regulations that might affect workplace safety and health. In the
process, however, the Court splintered into several curious factions,
eroded states' rights to a considerable degree while preserving much
of the states' legislative power within traditional spheres of local
interest, and opened issues that it inevitably will revisit. The Court
did all of this in Gade v National Solid Wastes Management Ass'n 25
without ever mentioning what may have been a driving force in the
case-the almost transparent attempt by the state to preserve in-
state jobs and discriminate against out-of-state employees and
employers.
Prompted by Congress in 1986 in the Superfund Amendments
and Reauthorization Act (SARA),12 6 the secretary of labor promul-
gated standards "for the health and safety protection of employees
engaged in hazardous waste operations.' ' 27 These included detailed
regulations on training requirements for workers engaged in an
124. In this regard, if the behavior here violated the Fourteenth Amendment Due
Process Clause, then similar behavior by the federal government would violate the
Fifth Amendment Due Process Clause.
125. 112 S Ct 2374 (1992).
126. SARA, Pub L 99-499, Title I, § 126, 100 Stat 1690-92, codified at note
following 29 USC § 655.
127. Gade, 112 S Ct 2379.
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activity that may expose them to hazardous wastes.1 2s Those satis-
fying these training requirements are certified to work in hazardous
waste operations. Working without certification is unlawful.
The state of Illinois enacted an overlapping licensing scheme.
Its "stated aim" is to "protect both employees and the general public
by licensing hazardous waste equipment operators and laborers
working at certain facilities.' ' 29 Unlicensed persons working in
hazardous waste operations, and employers who knowingly employ
them, may be fined.
An employer group sought to enjoin enforcement of the Illinois
licensing act, alleging that it was preempted or, in the alternative,
that it violated the Constitution's Commerce Clause. The district
court held that "dual impact" state laws, those that may regulate
workplace safety and health but have a substantial purpose apart
from promoting job safety, are not preempted by OSHA. The Illinois
licensing acts protected public safety in addition to promoting job
safety. They, therefore, were not preempted, except for the require-
ment that the employee training be conducted within the state of
Illinois. This limitation was seen as not contributing to Illinois's
"stated purpose" of protecting public safety. 30
The Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals reversed by split vote the
portion of the district court's opinion upholding the Illinois stat-
ute.'31 The majority held that unless the state has submitted an
approved state plan, OSHA preempts state laws that "constitute[] in
a direct, clear, and substantial way, regulation of worker health and
safety."'' 32 The state may not avoid preemption simply by asserting
128. Such employees must receive a minimum of 40 hours of off-site instruction
and three days of supervised field experience. On-site managers and supervisors of
hazardous waste operations must, in addition, receive eight additional hours of
specialized training. Id at 2380. Other employees that frequent hazardous waste facil-
ities infrequently or work at sites only marginally hazardous are required to receive
somewhat less training. Id. The federal regulations also require eight hours of annual
refresher training.
129. Id. Its training requirements for licensing to work on hazardous waste equip-
ment are considerably more stringent than are the above-mentioned federal require-
ments. Workers must (1) receive at least forty hours of approved training conducted
within the state of Illinois; (2) pass a written examination; (3) complete an eight-hour
annual refresher course; and (4) for a crane operator's license, the employee must
have 4,000 hours (500 days) of experience with equipment used in hazardous waste
handling.
130. Id at 2381. The Commerce Clause issue was dismissed for lack of ripeness.
131. National Solid Wastes Management Ass'n v Killian, 918 F2d 671 (7th Cir
1990).
132. Id at 679. Section 18(b) of OSHA permits a state, if it wishes, to "assume
responsibility for development and enforcement therein of occupational safety and
health standards relating to any occupational safety or health issue with respect to
which a Federal standard has been promulgated [by the Secretary of Labor under
OSHA]." The process for assuming this responsibility is to submit for the secretary
of labor's approval a "state plan for the development of such standards and their
enforcement."
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that the regulation was intended as an environmental regulation or
that the rule might advance public safety. Here, Illinois had not
submitted a state plan. The case was remanded to the district court
to apply the Court's "direct, clear, and substantial" regulation of job
safety test.
Writing separately, Judge Easterbrook offered that OSHA
preempts only state law that conflicts with OSHA, but that if OSHA
does preempt state law more broadly than that, the majority test is
appropriate.
Thus, Gade presented two issues: First, does OSHA preempt
nonconflicting state law, of states that have not obtained approved
state plans, when that state law establishes an occupational safety
and health standard on an issue for which OSHA has already prom-
ulgated a standard? Second, did Congress intend to preempt all
nonapproved state occupational safety and health regulations
whenever a federal standard is in effect, including preempting "dual
impact" laws that address public safety as well as occupational
safety?
As to the threshold question regarding the preemptive capacity
of OSHA, one would have thought that no real issue existed. Since
its enactment in 1970, OSHA has been widely, almost universally,
understood to preempt the state regulation of workplace safety and
health if (1) a federal standard regarding that workplace safety or
health issue has been promulgated, and (2) the state has not had
approved, by the secretary of labor, a plan authorizing it to prom-
ulgate its own standards. 3
By the slim margin of 5-4 the Court agreed with this over-
whelming view of the lower courts. The majority reasoned that
nonapproved state regulation of occupational safety and health
issues for which a federal standard is in effect "is impliedly pre-
empted as in conflict with the full purposes and objectives of [OSHA
because] the design of [OSHA is] that Congress intended to subject
employers and employees to only one set of regulations, be it federal
or state.... " a134
Only by securing an approved state plan, the majority contin-
ued, may a state "regulate an OSHA-regulated occupational safety
and health issue .... ,,,35 Otherwise, there would be no purpose for
133. As the majority of the Court in Gade, stated,
[elvery ... federal and state court confronted with an [OSHA] pre-emption
challenge has reached the ... conclusion [that OSHA] pre-empts any state law
or regulation that establishes an occupational health and safety standard on
an issue for which [the OSH Administration] has already promulgated a stan-
dard, unless the State has obtained the Secretary's approval for its own plan.
112 S Ct at 2386.
134. Id at 2383.
135. Id.
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Congress to have provided in OSHA for approved state plans. More-
over, the secretary of labor may approve a state plan only if state
standards that affect interstate commerce "are required by compel-
ling local conditions" and "do not unduly burden interstate
commerce.' 3 6 If states could enforce job safety standards without
filing state plans, thereby circumventing the secretary of labor's
approval process, there would be no means to enforce Congress'
intent that the states be permitted to set job safety and health stan-
dards only if they do not unduly burden commerce and are required
by compelling local conditions. In short, any nonapproved state
regulation of a job safety or health issue to which a federal standard
has been promulgated is preempted.
A surprising four dissenting members of the Court disagreed with
the above preemption analysis that had universally been accepted
by the courts since the enactment of OSHA-the moderates, Justices
Blackmun and Stevens and also Justices Souter and Thomas. They
would find preemption only if state regulation conflicts with a federal
standard "in the sense that enforcement of one would preclude
application of the other."'' 3 7 The dissent's reasoning was that
Congress preempts either the entire field touched by a federal stat-
ute or Congress preempts state regulation that conflicts. Here,
Congress did not occupy the field as readily seen by the states' legit-
imate presence when (1) there is no federal job safety standard, and
(2) by the provision for approved state plans. Accordingly, OSHA
only preempts conflicting state law. 38 State law conflicts either when
it cannot coexist with federal law or when it " 'stands as an obstacle
to the accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and objec-
tives of Congress.' "'139 Here, state job safety standards do not impede
congressional objectives because nothing in the text of OSHA suggests
that employers and employees must be subject only to one set of
regulations. Congress may well have provided for approved state
plans in order to permit states to preempt federal law. Otherwise,
nonconflicting nonapproved state law was intended to coexist with
federal law. 40 Setting conditions for the secretary's approval of State
plans does not require a contrary result. While the secretary would
not be able to guard against state standards that burden commerce
unduly, except when a state submits a state plan, the Courts would
136. Id at 2384. See OSHA § 18(c)(2).
137. Id at 2391 (Souter dissenting).
138. See id at 2392-93 (Souter dissenting).
139. Id (quoting Hines v Davidowitz, 312 US 52, 67 (1941)).
140. Id at 2392.
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provide that protection through the dormant Commerce Clause
doctrine.141
Finding that OSHA preempts nonapproved state standards of
OSHA-regulated job safety issues did not end the analysis. The ques-
tion remained whether the Illinois licensing act, a "dual impact"
statute, fell within OSHA's preemptive sweep.
The plurality held that a "dual impact" law is an occupational
safety and health standard preempted by OSHA.142 The OSHA defi-
nition of an "occupational safety and health standard" is broad
enough to include "dual impact" laws. 43 Moreover, a federal statute's
preemptive field is defined not only by a state law's "professed
purpose" but also by its effect. If the effect of a "dual impact" law
is regulation of job safety and health, then the specter of duplicative
regulation looms, contrary to congressional intent. Otherwise, a state
could always defeat OSHA preemption by enacting a nonconflicting
job safety or health standard and articulating some nonoccupational
purpose.'
44
In one final paragraph, however, the plurality delivered states'
rights from virtually unbridled federal preemption. Only unap-
proved state law that" 'constitutes, in a direct, clear and substantial
way, regulation of worker health and safety' " is preempted. 45
Accordingly, "state laws of general applicability (such as laws
regarding traffic safety or fire safety) that do not conflict with OSHA
standards and that regulate the conduct of workers and non-work-
ers alike would generally not be preempted. Although some laws of
general applicability may have a 'direct and substantial' effect on
worker safety, they cannot fairly be characterized as 'occupational'
standards because they regulate workers simply as members of the
general public.' 46 The Illinois law, by contrast, was directed at
workplace safety. That it may have had some salutary effect outside
the workplace did not save it from preemption.
Three thoughts come to mind. First, we all can expect some close
questions to arise as courts attempt to discern between state laws
that regulate job safety and health and laws of general applicability
that "regulate the conduct of workers and non-workers alike," (i.e.,
regulate workers qua members of the public). This principle may be
141. Id. Justice Kennedy, concurring, agreed with the plurality on the preemptive
scope of OSHA but found express, not implied, preemption. See id at 2389-90 (Kennedy
concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).
142. Id at 2386.
143. Id.
144. Id at 2387.
145. Id (quoting with approval the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals decision in
Gade, 918 F2d at 679).
146. Id at 2387-88. The Court cited as an example, "licensing practitioners and
regulating the practice of professions." Id at 2388.
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more easily announced than applied. However it is applied, it is clear
that Gade will stand as a bulwark against state protective labor
legislation in the area of workplace safety and health, at least in
those states that do not have state plans.
Second, I am unaware of any OSHA section 18(c)(2) case involv-
ing the secretary asserting that approval of a state plan should be
denied or revoked because the state is too aggressively protecting
worker job safety interests. Normally one thinks of the opposite
problem. But Gade suggests that the secretary may be able to come
to the aid of employers suffering from perceived overzealousness of
state legislatures in states that have approved plans when state
regulation of job safety or health creates an "undue burden on
commerce." If Gade opens that role for the secretary, that may be
the first judicial invitation the secretary has received to throttle
workplace safety and health initiatives of states with approved
plans.
Finally, throughout the plurality opinion, Justice O'Connor
repeatedly argued that the state of Illinois's "stated reason" for
enacting its licensing acts should not control. One has to wonder
whether the Court credited the state's representation that these were
intended to protect workers and the public from adverse effects of
improper handling of hazardous materials. This question fairly arises
because the clear effect of, for example, requiring 500 days of expe-
rience prior to licensing, of requiring successful completion of a
written examination approved by Illinois officials, and of requiring
substantial training in a course approved by the State of Illinois and
held in an Illinois training facility is to give a clear competitive
advantage to Illinois residents seeking jobs as hazardous waste
handlers. Few, outside the state of Illinois, would likely have accu-
mulated the training credentials necessary for licensing in the Illi-
nois. In short, this statute places an undue burden on the free flow
of commerce by discriminating in effect against non-Illinois resi-
dents. So viewed, Gade is more akin to a section 10(k) determination
assigning work jurisdiction than it is a preemption case. It answers
the question of who will determine whether a licensing scheme, such
as Illinois's, effects an undue burden on commerce: the secretary of
labor if asked to approve a state plan incorporating the Illinois
scheme (the plurality's choice) or the federal courts through dormant
Commerce Clause adjudication (the dissent's choice)? Informing Illi-
nois that its law discriminates against out-of-state residents and,
thus, is an undue burden on commerce is as unpleasant as it is neces-
sary. The task is a hot potato that the Court seems happy to throw
into the lap of the secretary, the federal institution best able to take
the heat. Gade, ostensibly a federalism case, may thus be viewed as
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a fascinating exercise in separation of powers politics. But, none of




ERISA § 1056(d)(1)-Applicability of Nonalienability Provision
in Bankruptcy Proceedings
Blackmun J.: "[a]n anti-alienation provision in an ERISA-qual-
ified pension plan constitutes a restriction on transfer
enforceable under 'applicable nonbankruptcy law' for
purposes of the ... exclusion of property from the debtor's
bankruptcy estate."
The federal courts have long been divided over the issue of
whether a bankruptcy debtor's interest in an ERISA-qualified pension
plan should be included or excluded from estate property available
to creditors. 47
The issue arises because an ERISA-qualified pension plan must
contain an anti-alienation provision and the Bankruptcy Code (Code)
excludes from the bankruptcy estate the debtor's property that is
subject to a restriction on transfer enforceable under "applicable
nonbankruptcy law.' 48 In Patterson v Shumate, 49 the Court unan-
imously held that the ERISA anti-alienation requirement is an
"applicable nonbankruptcy law." Therefore, ERISA-qualified
pensions are protected from being lost in a bankruptcy proceeding.
The focus of the controversy was whether the Code's reference
to "applicable nonbankruptcy law" incorporated only state spend-
thrift trust law and not federal law such as ERISA. If it did only
include state law, as the district court in this case held, the ERISA-
qualified pension benefits of the bankruptcy debtor, Joseph Shumate,
would have been lost in bankruptcy. For in Virginia, Shumate's home
state, Shumate's interest in his pension did not qualify under the
state's spendthrift trust law. The Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals
reversed the district court. It held that Shumate's interest in his
pension should be excluded from his bankruptcy estate because
ERISA's anti-alienation requirement for ERISA-qualified plans
constitutes a limit on transfer in an "applicable nonbankruptcy law."
Rejecting the district court's crabbed interpretation of the Bank-
ruptcy Code and affirming the court of appeals, the Supreme Court
reasoned (1) that nothing in the "plain meaning" of the Code suggests
147. See collected cases in Patterson v Shumate, 112 S Ct 2242, 2246 n1 (1992).
148. 11 USC § 541(c)(2).
149. Patterson, 112 S Ct at 2248.
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that the phrase "applicable nonbankruptcy law" is limited to state
law; (2) that when Congress desired to restrict a reference to
nonbankruptcy law in other portions of the Code to state law, it did
so explicitly; (3) that the legislative history of the Code does not
compel a reading of the Code different from its "plain meaning;" (4)
that giving the phrase its plain meaning does not make nugatory any
other provision of the Code; (5) that protecting ERISA-qualified plans
from bankruptcy advances ERISA's goal of providing workers prom-
ised defined pension benefits upon retirement if the those benefits
have vested; and (6) that the Court's holding here ensures national
uniform treatment of pension benefits rather than leaving their
protection to the vagaries of state spendthrift trust law.
To be sure, the Court's unanimous opinion limits the inclusion
of assets in the bankruptcy estate. Moreover, "isolated excerpts from
the legislative history [of the Bankruptcy Code]" somewhat support
limiting "applicable nonbankruptcy law" to state spendthrift law,
but these considerations could not overcome the "clarity of the stat-
utory language at issue"1 60 and the pernicious impact on ERISA policy
arising from a holding allowing ERISA-qualified pensions to be lost
in bankruptcy in some states but not in others. 5 1
Nationwide Mutual Insurance Company v Darden
Definition of Employee-Independent Contractors
Souter J.: "[W]e adopt a common-law test for determining who
qualifies as an 'employee' under ERISA[,] ... 'the general
common law of agency, rather than ... the law of any partic-
ular state.' "
The scope of the term "employee" in section 3(6) of ERISA 152 is
the question answered in Nationwide Mutual Insurance Company v
Darden.153 The Court held unanimously that the term "incorpo-
rate[s] traditional agency law criteria for identifying master-servant
relationships." 154
Robert Darden brought an ERISA action against Nationwide after
Nationwide disqualified him from receiving retirement plan benefits
150. Id.
151. Justice Scalia filed a concurring opinion. He found it "mystifying" that three
courts of appeal could have come to a conclusion different from the Court's and
scolded them for "departing] from attention to text" and not adhering to "agreed-
upon methodology for ... interpreting text." He saw in such "legal culture" a possible
lack of commitment the notion of "'a government of laws, not of men.'" Id at 2250
(Scalia concurring). Only through application of "neutral and rational interpretive
methodology" can the legal profession, in his view, maintain as its symbol the "scales,
not the see-saw." Id at 2251.
152. Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA) § 3(6), 29 USC
§ 1002(6).
153. 112 S Ct 1344 (1992).
154. Id at 1346.
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he had earned over eighteen years of service working as an insur-
ance agent selling Nationwide's insurance policies. The employment
contracts included various covenants not to compete following
termination of the relationship. These contracts provided that Darden
would forfeit his interest in retirement plan benefits Nationwide
otherwise was contractually bound to provide Darden should he
breach the covenants not to compete. Nationwide ended its relation-
ship with Darden in 1980 and he thereupon, allegedly, breached the
covenants not to compete. Nationwide reacted by disqualifying
Darden from receiving retirement plan benefits. He sued, alleging an
ERISA violation on the theory that his interest in the retirement
plan could not lawfully be forfeited because that interest had vested
under the terms of ERISA.1 55
Darden sued as a "participant" to enforce the substantive terms
of ERISA. To be a "participant" one must be an employee or former
employee eligible to receive a benefit of any type from an employee
benefit plan.1 56 The district court found Darden was not an
employee-thus not a "participant": He was an independent
contractor. The Fourth Circuit reversed. 57 Acknowledging that
Darden would not be viewed an employee under common law prin-
ciples, the Court, nevertheless, concluded that Darden met the ERISA
definition of employee. Examination of the congressional purposes
of ERISA, the circuit court reasoned, suggests that one is an employee
if that person has a reasonable expectation of receiving pension
benefits, if that person relied on this expectation, and if that person
"lacked the economic bargaining power to contract out of the benefit
plan's forfeiture provisions. '1 58 On remand, the district court found
that Darden met this definition of employee and the court of appeals
affirmed.5 9
Reversing the court of appeals, the Supreme Court first summa-
rized the many contexts that it previously had interpreted the word
"employee" in federal law and had concluded that Congress intended
to incorporate the " 'conventional master-servant relationship as
understood by common-law agency doctrine.' "160 Absent evidence
to the contrary, the Court stated, it will assume that when Congress
adopts terms with common law meaning its intent is to give those
155. 29 USC § 1053(a).
156. Nationwide, 112 S Ct at 1347.
157. 796 F2d 701 (1986).
158. Darden v Nationwide Mutual Ins. Co., 922 F2d 203, 205 (4th Cir 1991)
(Darden II) (summarizing Darden I).
159. Darden 11, 922 F2d at 205.
160. Nationwide, 112 S Ct at 1348 (quoting Communityfor Creative Non-Violence
v Reid, 490 US 730, 739-40) (1989)). The Court distinguished its more expansive
definition of employee in the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA). Certain language
appearing in FLSA is absent in ERISA. See discussion, id at 1350.
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terms their common law definition.' 61 While it is true that in the past
the Court has announced that statutory terms should be interpreted
in light of a statute's purpose, too often when that rule of construc-
tion has been applied to give the term "employee" a meaning other
than its common law meaning, the Congress has responded by
amending the statute so construed to incorporate the common law
definition. 62 As the Court concluded, "a principle of statutory
construction can endure just so many legislative revisitations." 63
At common law, the hiring party's "right to control the manner
and means by which the product is accomplished" is the critical
factor for determining whether one is an employee. 6 4 The Court
remanded this case to the court of appeals to apply this "right
to control" test, that is, by " 'assessing all of the incidents of the
relationship.' ,,165
Nationwide promises to become a very important ERISA case as
those of you who practice regularly in the ERISA area no doubt read-
ily recognize. Even without the benefit of that expertise, I can see
several significant issues.
First, Darden's difficulty was that, arguably, he was an inde-
pendent contractor. Others might be found not to be employees under
common law master-servant doctrine because, for example, they are
the masters-the owners of companies, the chief executive officers
of companies, lower ranking officers of companies, managerial
personnel, or supervisors. Literally thousands of ERISA-qualified
plans cover such persons. Does Nationwide mean that none of these
persons may enforce rights secured by ERISA?' 66
For example, in Patterson, the other ERISA case decided this
term and discussed immediately above, Shumate, the person whose
retirement benefits were put at risk by bankruptcy proceedings, was
the president and chair of the board of directors of the Coleman
Furniture Corporation when it filed for bankruptcy and when
Shumate himself filed for bankruptcy. At the Supreme Court, the
issue of whether he was an ERISA "employee" of Coleman was never
raised. If he were not an "employee," his pension could not be
shielded from bankruptcy by ERISA's anti-alienation provisions. If,
on the other hand, the president and chair of the board of directors
161. Id at 1348.
162. See discussion, id at 1349.
163. Id.
164. Id at 1348 (quoting Reid, 490 US at 751-52).
165. Id at 1349 (quoting NLRB v United Ins. Co. of America, 390 US 254, 258
(1968)). See also id at 1348 (listing authoritative sources for identifying a master-
servant relationship).
166. Compare Kwatcher v Massachusetts Service Employees Pension Fund, 879
F2d 957 (1st Cir 1989) (sole shareholder/employee of corporation ineligible to receive
benefits from ERISA plan due to anti-inurement provision of ERISA).
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has ERISA protection because that person is found to be a common
law servant but Darden, who sold insurance exclusively for Nation-
wide for eighteen years, is found to be a common law master, then
some might conclude that in a kinder and gentler America the law
protects the masters by calling them servants and harms the servants
by calling them masters. Some may see an unacceptable irony in such
an application of labor protective legislation and call for legislative
"revisitation."
Second, ever since the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals' 1965
decision in Blassie v Kroger Co. ,167 drafted by Justice Blackmun while
he served on that court, owners and chief executive officers of
corporations have been permitted to participate in Taft-Hartley
trusts even though such trusts must be created for the sole and
exclusive benefit of "employees." Will the constricted definition of
employee in ERISA now drive the definition of "employee" for
purposes of Taft-Hartley section 302(c)(5) trusts? If yes, every Taft-
Hartley trust that includes persons who are not "employees" under
common law master-servant doctrine is in violation of Taft-Hartley
section 302(c)(5), a criminal statute. In certain industries (e.g., the
construction industry) participation by owners and supervisors in
pension and welfare plans is quite common.1 68 If Congress did not
intend the term employee in section 302(c)(5) to be limited to common
law definitions of employee, then why did Congress choose a
narrower definition of employee in ERISA? Justice Blackmun was
not heard from in Nationwide and the Court had no reason to address
the section 302(c)(5) issue. At a minimum, Nationwide opens for
reexamination the scope of permissible participation in Taft-Hartley
section 302(c)(5) trusts.
B. Intergovernmental Tax Immunity
Barker v Kansas
Validity of State Tax on Pensions of Retired U.S. Military
Personnel While Exempting from Taxation Retirement Income
of Retired State and Local Employees
White J.: "[T]he Kansas Supreme Court's conclusion that, for
purposes of state taxation, military retirement benefits may
be characterized as current compensation for reduced current
services does not survive analysis in light of the manner in
which these benefits are calculated, our prior cases, or
167. 345 F2d 58 (8th Cir 1965)("[T]he president of a corporation is its
employee[[sJ]"). Id at 73.
168. lUlnions may have a strong interest in permitting employers to participate
in their employees' pension and welfare trusts as a way of investing the employer in
the long-term health of the trust.
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congressional intent as expressed in other provisions treat-
ing military retirement."
Soon following the Court's decision in Davis v Michigan Dep't
of Treasury,169 two class actions were filed. Together they comprised
14,000 military retirees. These actions sought declaratory and
injunctive relief against the state of Kansas, which taxes the bene-
fits received from the United States by military retirees but does not
tax the benefits received by retired state and local government
employees. The actions, consolidated in Barker v Kansas,17 0 also
sought a refund of any taxes paid on military retirement benefits by
class members for the tax years 1984 through 1989.
Plaintiffs primarily advanced two theories: (1) that the Kansas
tax was inconsistent with 4 USC § 111, which authorizes states to
tax pay received by United States employees "if the taxation does
not discriminate against the ... employee because of the source of
the pay .... "; and (2) that the tax violated constitutional principles
of intergovernmental tax immunity.
Just three Terms previously, in Davis, the Court had invalidated
under section 111 the Michigan income tax imposed on federal civil
service retirees. The issue in Barker was whether, applying the
approach of Davis, the Kansas scheme also was unlawful. The trial
court had granted summary judgment for the State of Kansas and
the Kansas Supreme Court had affirmed. 171 Other state courts had
found that similar taxing systems were invalid under the approach
adopted by the Supreme Court in Davis. The Supreme Court reversed
and found the Kansas law invalid.
In Davis, the Court made the pivotal finding that section 111
paralleled the prohibition against discriminatory taxation embodied
in the modern constitutional doctrine of intergovernmental tax
immunity: that the Court will inquire "whether the inconsistent tax
treatment is directly related to, and justified by, 'significant differ-
ences between the two classes.' ",172
In Barker, the state proffered a variety of significant differ-
ences between military retirees and state and local retirees to justify
the discriminatory tax treatment of their retirement benefits. 173 The
principal argument Kansas raised was that " 'federal miliary retire-
ment benefits are not deferred compensation but current pay for
continued readiness to return to duty.' "'174 The Supreme Court,
169. 489 US 803 (1989).
170. 112 S Ct 1619 (1992).
171. See id at 1623.
172. Davis, 489 US at 813 (quoting Phillips Chemical Co. v Dumas Independent
School Dist., 361 US 376, 383 (1960)).
173. See discussion, Barker, 112 S Ct at 1622-23.
174. Id at 1622 (quoting Barker, 249 Kan 186, 196, 815 P2d 46, 53 (1991)).
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acknowledging that "[m]ilitary retirees unquestionably remain in the
service and are subject to restrictions and recall," 175 concluded,
nevertheless, that military retirement pay bears the most important
features of deferred compensation: The amount is calculated on the
basis of years of service and not present duties. Moreover, the Court's
precedents suggest that military retirement pay has been viewed as
deferred compensation, and the Act's legislative history shows
Congress intended to treat military retirement pay as deferred
compensation. 176
The Court ended its analysis with an extraordinary suggestion
of duplicity by the state of Kansas. The Court stated that "[tihe
State's position is weakened further by another fact, that Kansas
tax law considers military retirement benefits as current compen-
sation under its general income tax provision but it does not for IRA
deductibility purposes.' 17 7 The Court concluded: "[Ais the United
States persuasively contends, 'The State's failure to treat military
retired pay consistently suggests that the State's articulated ration-
ale is not in fact the basis for the disparate treatment, but only a
cloak for discrimination against federally funded benefits.' 178,
VI. Workers' Compensation
A. Federal Employers' Liability Act (FELA)
Hilton v South Carolina Public Railways Commission
Coverage of State-Owned Railroads for Suits Brought in State
Court
Kennedy J.: "[M]aking the States' liability or immunity [under
federal statutes] the same in both federal and state courts
has much to commend it.... [B]ut symmetry [should not] over-
ride just expectations which themselves rest upon the
predictability and order of stare decisis."
Extension of federal workers' compensation statutes to the state
governments acting as employers has been the source of considera-
175. Id at 1623.
176. See discussion, id at 1623-25. The Court pointed out that Congress has given
the states the option of applying their community property laws to military retirement
benefits. "To extend to states the option of deeming such benefits as part of the marital
estate as a matter of state law would be inconsistent with the notion that military
retirement pay should be treated as indistinguishable from compensation for reduced
current services." Id at 1625.
177. Id at 1626.
178. Id (quoting Brief for the United States asAmicus Curiae 22). Justice Stevens
(joined by Justice Thomas) concurred. He recited the essence of his dissent in Davis
but, concurring here, stated that he wrote separately "because what I regard as this
Court's perverse application of the nondiscrimination principle is subject to review
and correction by Congress." Id.
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ble litigation over the years.1 7 9 Hilton v South Carolina Public Rail-
ways Commission8 0 represents the most recent chapter of that
controversy. Here, the Court reaffirmed that the Federal Employees
Liability Act (FELA)' 8 ' creates a cause of action against a state-owned
railway, enforceable in state court. A contrary holding would have
stripped all FELA (and probably Jones Act) protection from workers
employed by the states.
Thirty years ago in Parden v Terminal Railway of Alabama
State Docks Dep't1 82 the Court held that the FELA authorizes damage
suits against state-owned railways and by entering the railroad
business a state waives its Eleventh Amendment immunity from suit
in federal court. Subsequently, the Court decided Welch v Texas Dep't
of Highways and Public Transportation.183 There it held that the
Jones Act does not abrogate state's Eleventh Amendment immunity.
It did not reach the question of whether the Jones Act (or the FELA)
creates a cause of action against the states enforceable in state court.
Since the Jones Act incorporates the remedial scheme of the
FELA, Welch raised the question whether Parden had in effect been
overruled by Welch. Hilton resolved that uncertainty, holding (6-
2)184 that Parden remains, in part, good law.
In Hilton, an employee of the South Carolina Railway Commis-
sion suffered a job-related injury. He filed a FELA action in federal
court. After the Supreme Court's decision in Welch, however, the
employee withdrew his federal court action and refiled his FELA
claim in a South Carolina state court. That eliminated the Eleventh
Amendment infirmity of the prior suit but left intact the issue of
whether in FELA Congress intended to create a cause of action
against the states-the issue left unresolved in Welch vis e vis the
Jones Act.
The South Carolina court dismissed the FELA action. It relied
on a recent decision of its state supreme court, Freeman v South
Carolina Public Railways Commission.8 5 In Freeman, the South
Carolina Supreme Court found that, contrary to the statutory
construction of the United States Supreme Court in Parden, Congress
did not intend in FELA to create a cause of action against the states.
179. See, for example, Welch v Texas Dep't of Highways and Public Transpor-
tation, 483 US 468 (1987) (Jones Act did not abrogate state's Eleventh Amendment
immunity-discussing the ongoing controversy); Parden v Terminal Railway of
Alabama State Docks Dep't, 377 US 184 (1964) (FELA authorizes an action for money
damages against an agency of the state, even if the suit is maintained in a state forum.).
180. 112 S Ct 560 (1991).
181. 45 USC §§ 51-60.
182. 377 US 184 (1964).
183. 483 US 468 (1987).
184. 112 S Ct 560. Justice Thomas did not participate in this decision.
185. 302 SC 51, 393 SE2d 383 (1990).
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It found "determinative" a section 1983 decision of the Supreme
Court' " holding that the state is not suable under section 1983, either
in a state or federal forum, absent a clear statement in that statute
manifesting a congressional intent to impose liability on a state.18 7
From this reasoning, the South Carolina Supreme Court synthesized
a general rule: A statute will not be interpreted to create a cause of
action for money damages against a state unless it contains "unmis-
takenly clear language" manifesting a congressional intent to do so.
The Freeman court found no such clear language in FELA.
The so-called "plain statement" rule, applied as a rule of stat-
utory construction in Will, conforms to the current methodology in
Eleventh Amendment cases to determine whether Congress abro-
gated the states' immunity from suit in federal court. 88 The decision
of the South Carolina Supreme Court implicitly argued that symme-
try must be achieved by imposing the "plain statement" rule both
when the issue is whether Congress abrogated the states' Eleventh
Amendment rights not to be sued in a federal court and also whether
Congress intended to create a cause of action against the states
enforceable in state courts.
In Hilton, the United States Supreme Court majority, speaking
through Justice Kennedy, noted that FELA covers "[elvery common
carrier by railroad" and expressed reluctance to reverse Parden, a
twenty-eight year old precedent which had interpreted that language
to include state-owned railroads. Stare decisis, the Court mused, is
of " 'fundamental importance to the rule of law.' "189 It "promotes
stability, predictability, and respect for judicial authority."' 90 Prec-
edent should not be disturbed absent compelling reasons. Relying on
notions of separation of powers, the Court offered that stare decisis
in the context of statutory interpretation raises considerations
having " 'special force [because] the legislative power is implicated,
and Congress remains free to alter what we have done.' "191 Noting
that Congress has for almost thirty years chosen not to correct the
statutory interpretation in Parden, and noting that many persons
have relied on it and that a reversal "would dislodge settled rights
186. 42 USC § 1983.
187. Will v Michigan Dep't of State Police, 491 US 58 (1989).
188. See, for example, Atascadero State Hospital v Scanlon, 473 US 234, 242
(1985).
189. Hilton, 112 S Ct at 563 (quoting Welch, 483 US 468, 494 (1987)).
190. Id at 564. See Vasquez v Hillery, 474 US 254, 265-66 (1986).
191. Hilton, 112 S Ct at 564 (quoting Patterson v McLean Credit Union, 491 US
164, 172-73 (1989)). The negative implication, of course, is that stare decisis is less
compelling in the context of constitutional interpretation.
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and expectations or require an extensive legislative response," the
majority refused to reverse Parden.192
The symmetry achieved by using the "plain statement" rule both
as a rule of constitutional law and as a canon of statutory construc-
tion is appealing, but "symmetry is not an imperative that must
override just expectations which themselves rest upon the predict-
ability and order of stare decisis."'9 3
Protecting the reliance interests created here by "longstanding
statutory construction" 19 4 generates certain federalism costs. The
most significant, perhaps, is federal appropriation of state courts as
the exclusive forum for enforcing FELA rights against an unwilling
state government. This cost can be halted should Congress choose to
amend FELA and by "plain statement" abrogate the states' Eleventh
Amendment immunity from FELA suits in federal court. Until then,
federal FELA rights of state employees will be left to the care and
protection of state court judges, some of whom may prefer not to be
so imposed upon by the federal government.
Finally, it does seem clear, as it has since the decision in Will,
that absent the buildup of substantial reliance interests from well-
entrenched precedent, the Court will refuse to find a congressional
intent to create a cause of action against the state, absent a "clear
statement" to that effect. Hilton, nevertheless, produces under-
standable anxiety in those fearing that certain objectionable Warren
Court precedent will be frozen into current jurisprudence. Whether
Hilton will have that effect, will depend on how the lower courts
divine the amount of congressional silence that manifests concur-
rence with precedent and how much reliance, and by whom, will be
deemed necessary to implicate the Hilton exception to the general
rule set out in Will. On the answer to these questions may rest the
continued viability of Warren Court precedent applying labor and
social legislation to the states.
192. Id at 564. The court noted that many state workers' compensation statutes
exclude railway employees on the assumption that FELA provides adequate coverage.
Id. The Court also expressed concern that a reversal of Parden would raise doubt
regarding the application of other federal railway legislation to the states, such as
the Safety Appliance Act and the Railway Labor Act. Id.
193. Id at 566. The dissent (O'Connor joined by Scalia) somewhat bitterly disa-
greed. The dissent argued that the constitutional balance between the States and the
Federal Government is upset just as much when the federal government forces the
state to entertain a damage suit against itself in its own courts as when it is forced
to defend those suits in federal court. Both implicate the states' sovereign immunity,
which Congress has the power to abrogate. The dissent saw no reason to apply the
"plain statement" rule to ascertain abrogation as to one aspect of state sovereign
immunity but not to the other. Id at 566-70.
194. Hilton, 112 S Ct at 566.
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B. Longshore and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act
Southwest Marine v Gizoni
Exclusion from Jones Act Coverage Because Occupation is within
LHWCA
White J.: "[Tlhe [Longshore and Harbor Workers Compensa-
tion Act] preserves the Jones Act remedy for vessel crewmen,
even if they are employed by a shipyard. ... 'It is not the
employee's particular job that is determinative [of LHWCA
rather than Jones Act coverage], but the employee's connec-
tion to a vessel....' Because a ship repairman may spend all
of his working time aboard a vessel in furtherance of its
mission,-even one used exclusively in ship repair work-that
worker may qualify as a Jones Act seaman."
Estate of Cowart v Nicklos Drilling Co.
Effect of Compromise by Employee with Third-Party Tort-Feasor
on Employer/Carrier Liability
Kennedy J.: "The [Longshore and Harbor Workers Compen-
sation Act] is unambiguous in providing forfeiture whenever
an LHWCA claimant fails to get written approval from his
employer of a third-party settlement."
The Longshore and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act (LHWCA
or the Act) 195 requires employers to provide compensation, "irre-
spective of fault," for injuries and death of workers while employed
upon the navigable waters of the United States. In return, the Act
grants the employer immunity from tort liability, regardless of the
egregiousness of its fault. Benefits under the LHWCA are set out in
schedules in the Act and are limited, generally, to medical benefits
and two-thirds of lost earnings.
This term the Court considered two LHWCA cases: Southwest
Marine, Inc. v Gizoni,196 and Estate of Cowart v Nicklos Drilling Co. 197
Southwest Marine settled a circuit split regarding exclusion from
Jones Act' 98 coverage because a worker's occupation is within the
scope of the LHWCA. Estate of Cowart v Nicklos Drilling Co entailed
no circuit split but reversed a longstanding and widely accepted
interpretation of the LHWCA that concerns the effect of compromise
by an employee with a third-party tort-feasor on an employer's
liability under the LHWCA.
In Southwest Marine, a rigging foreman was injured seriously
195. 33 USC §9 901 et seq.
196. 112 S Ct 486 (1991).
197. 112 S Ct 2589 (1992).
198. 46 USC App § 688.
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while working on a towed floating platform used to transport a ship's
rudder from the shipyard to a dry dock. He submitted a claim and
received medical and compensation benefits voluntarily from South-
west Marine pursuant to the LHWCA. He later sued Southwest Marine
under the Jones Act alleging he was a seaman injured as a result of
his employer's negligence.
In the Jones Act claim, the district court held, as a matter of law
and based solely on the employee's job title and occupation, that he
was not a Jones Act seaman. 99 The district court also found that
since the employee was a harbor worker, his Jones Act action was
precluded by the exclusive remedy provisions in the LHWCA. 20 0 The
Ninth Circuit reversed, holding that status as a seaman under the
Jones Act is a jury question. It cannot be determined as a matter of
law, based on job title and occupation. In Southwest Marine, the
Supreme Court affirmed the court of appeals unanimously. 20 ' It
reasoned that certain occupations engaged in by harbor workers
clearly are covered by the LHWCA. The ship rigger occupation, for
example, is one. But the LHWCA excludes "a master or member of
a crew of any vessel" (a " 'refinement' of the term 'seaman' in the
Jones Act") 20 2 from its definition of employees covered by the
LHWCA.20 3 Thus, "the LHWCA preserves the Jones Act remedy for
vessel crewmen, even if they are employed by a shipyard" because
"it is not the employee's particular job that is determinative [of
LHWCA rather than Jones Act coverage], but the employee's connec-
tion to a vessel. ' 20 4 Because a ship repairman may spend all of his
working time aboard a vessel in furtherance of its mission-even
one used exclusively in ship repair work-that worker may qualify
as a Jones Act "seaman." Accordingly, in each case, a factual ques-
tion arises whether a harbor worker also has seaman status. " '[Ilt
will depend on the nature of the vessel, and the employee's precise
relation to it ... [A] seaman must be doing the ship's work.' "205
199. Southwest Marine, 112 S Ct 486, 490. The district court reinforced the
conclusion that plaintiff was not a Jones Act seaman by also finding that the floating
platforms on which he worked were not "vessels in navigation." Id.
200. Id. Under the LHWCA, the liability provided by that statute "shall be exclu-
sive and in place of all other liability of such employer to the employee .. " 33 USC
§ 905(a).
201. 112 S Ct 486. Justice Thomas did not participate in the decision.
202. Id at 491 (citing McDermott Int'l v Wilander, 111 S Ct 807, 813 (1991)).
203. 33 USC § 902(3)(G). See Southwest Marine, 112 S Ct at 491.
204. See id at 492.
205. Id (citing McDermott, 111 S Ct at 817-18).
The Court rejected several rebuttal arguments. First, the Court rejected as inap-
posite that it previously had held that the LHWCA provides the exclusive remedy for
certain injured rail workers otherwise permitted by the Federal Employees' Liability
Act (FELA), 45 USC § 51 et seq to pursue a negligence cause of action. The LHWCA
does not contain an exemption for rail workers as it does for "a member of a crew of
any vessel," the Court reasoned. Southwest Marine, 112 S Ct at 492-93. The Court
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Estate of Cowart v Nicklos Drilling Co. 20 6 presented a much more
contested question of statutory construction. Here, the Court
confronted a provision in the LHWCA that permits injured workers,
without forgoing compensation under the LHWCA, to pursue claims
against third parties. LHWCA section 33(g) provides that, under
certain circumstances, if a third-party claim is settled without writ-
ten approval of the worker's employer, all future benefits under
LHWCA are forfeited.20 7 The issue presented was whether the forfei-
ture provision applies to a worker whose employer, at the time the
worker settles with a third party, is neither paying compensation to
the worker nor is yet subject to an order to pay under the Act.
Briefly, Floyd Cowart suffered an injury to his hand in 1983
while working on an oil platform. The injury was covered by the
LHWCA. The Department of Labor notified Cowart's employer,
Nicklos Drilling Co., that Cowart was owed permanent disability
payments in the amount of approximately $35,000 plus penalties
and interest. This was an informal notice that did not constitute an
award. No payments were made.
Meanwhile, Cowart sued the owner of the oil drilling platform,
Transco Exploration Company (Transco), alleging that its negligence
caused his injury. Cowart received approximately $29,000 from a
$45,000 settlement with Transco, the remainder going to attorney
fees and other expenses. Nicklos had actual notice of the settlement
because Nicklos funded it under an indemnification agreement with
also rejected Southwest Marine's primary jurisdiction argument, holding that Congress
did not intend that district courts stay Jones Act litigation pending a final LHWCA
"administrative agency" determination that the Jones Act plaintiff is, in fact, a "master
or member of a crew." Id at 493. Finally, recognizing that the employee here, prior
to initiating his Jones Act claim, had received voluntary LHWCA benefits from his
employer, the Court held that it is " 'universally accepted' " that the employee is not
for that reason also barred from seeking Jones Act relief. Id. The LHWCA provides
that "any amounts paid to an employee for the same injury, disability, or death
pursuant to the Jones Act shall be credited against any liability imposed by the
LHWCA." Id at 494.
206. 112 S Ct 2589 (1992).
207. Section 33(g) provides, in part:
(g) Compromise obtained by person entitled to compensation
(1) If the person entitled to compensation ... enters into a settlement with
a third person ... for an amount less than the compensation to which the
person ... would be entitled under this chapter, the employer shall be liable
for compensation as determined under subsection (f) of this section only if
written approval of the settlement is obtained from the employer and the
employer's carrier, before the settlement is executed ....
(2) If no written approval of the settlement is obtained.., or if the employee
fails to notify the employer of any settlement obtained from or judgment
rendered against a third person, all rights to compensation and medical bene-
fits under this chapter shall be terminated, regardless of whether the employer
or the employer's insurer has made payments or acknowledged entitlement
to benefits under this chapter.
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Transco. Cowart, however, did not secure from Nicklos a formal,
prior, written approval of the Transco settlement.
After settling, Cowart sought the remaining disability payments
owed by Nicklos under the LHWCA. Nicklos denied liability, alleging
that Cowart had forfeited his benefits by failing to secure approval
of the settlement from Nicklos and its insurance carrier. "Counsel
for [Nicklos] stated during oral argument [before the Supreme Court]
that he had used the Transco settlement as a means of avoiding
Nicklos' liability under the LHWCA. ' '20 8
For more than fourteen years, the director of the Office of
Workers' Compensation Programs (OWCP) interpreted section 33(g)'s
forfeiture provisions as applying only to injured employees whose
employers were making permanent compensation payments, whether
voluntary or pursuant to an award. This view first was adopted in
1977 by the Benefits Review Board (Board or BRB) in O'Leary v
Southeast Stevedoring Co. 20 9 and endorsed unanimously by the Ninth
Circuit Court of Appeals.21 0 Section 33(g) was amended in 1984.
Congress redesignated section (g) as subsection (g)(1) and added the
current subsection (g)(2). 211 Subsequent to that revision, the BRB, in
1986, held in Dorsey v Cooper Stevedoring Co. that the 1984 amend-
ments had not altered the Board's previous view that section 33(g)'s
forfeiture language had no applicability except in cases when an
employer is making voluntary payments under the Act or has been
found liable for benefits by a judicial determination. 12 This view
was affirmed unanimously by the Eleventh Circuit Court of
Appeals. 21 3 Congress was presumed to have adopted the Board's
previous interpretation and nothing in the legislative history of the
1984 amendments disclosed an intent to overrule the BRB's
interpretation.
Cowart's claim fell within this well-established precedent. The
administrative law judge and the BRB in his case each so held. The
Department of Labor's Director of OWCP also agreed, and indeed
entered an appearance on behalf of Cowart when the matter came
first before a panel of the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals and then
before that Court rehearing the case en banc.21 4 The Fifth Circuit
Court of Appeals, nevertheless, reversed. 215
After certiorari was granted in this case, and after Cowart's
208. Cowart, 112 S Ct at 2598.
209. 7 Ben Rev Bd Serv (MB) 144 (1977).
210. 622 F2d 595 (9th Cir 1980).
211. See text of the section as presently constituted, cited in note 213.
212. 18 Ben Rev Bd Serv (MB) 25 (1986).
213. See Cooper Stevedoring Co. v US Dep't of Labor, 826 F2d 1011 (11th Cir
1987).
214. Cowart, 112 S Ct at 2593; id at 2598-99 (Blackmun dissenting).
215. 907 F2d 1552 (5th Cir 1990).
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opening brief was filed, the United States reversed positions. The
director of the OWCP informed the Court that after "reexamin[ing]"
its position, it now was of the firm view that the position it had
advocated for fourteen years and had advocated before the court of
appeals was contrary to the Act's "plain meaning. '216 A divided
Supreme Court (6-3) agreed with the Labor Department's newly
discovered interpretation of section 33(g). This conclusion threatens
to strip LHWCA claims from thousands of injured employees. 217
The majority examined the language of section 33(g) and agreed
with the government that its "plain meaning" left no room for inter-
pretation.21 8 The LHWCA, the Court held, is unambiguous in provid-
ing forfeiture whenever a LHWCA claimant fails to get written
approval from his employer of a third-party settlement. Cowart,
Justice Kennedy wrotefor the majority, "made a mistake" that cost
him and his estate his LHWCA benefits.21 9
As might be expected, the majority's statutory interpretation
arguments are rational. But so are the dissent's. 220 That is the nature
of statutory interpretation arguments: There usually are plenty to
go around. The one thing eminently plain in this case, however, is
that the "plain language" of section 33(g) is anything but plain. 22'
One need only focus briefly at the Labor Department's fourteen-year
effort to understand the section, consider that the BRB interpreted
section 33(g) twice in a manner rejected as contrary to "plain mean-
ing," further consider that two unanimous courts of appeals deci-
sions also missed this "plain meaning" when they concurred with
the BRB's interpretation, and concentrate on the director of the
OWCP's shifting stance in this very case. It is pure fantasy to think
that what this case is about is a majority helplessly compelled to an
outcome driven by the "plain language" of the LHWCA section at
issue.
Clarity can begin to emerge by considering the practical effect
of the majority's holding in Cowart.
The aspiration of the LHWCA is that employers liable for bene-
fits will pay compensation "promptly," "directly," and "without an
216. Cowart, 112 S Ct at 2594; id at 2599, 2602 (Blackmun dissenting).
217. Id at 2598; id at 2599 (Blackmun dissenting).
218. Id at 2593-94. The Court found support also in the structure of the Act as
a whole and in the fact the Department of Labor's lack of consistent understanding
of the sweep of section 33(g). Id at 4694-95.
219. Id at 2592.
220. Compare id at 2594-98 with id at 2598-2608 (Blackmun dissenting).
221. See text of section, cited in note 213.
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award" having to be issued. 2 2 Under the BRB's view of section 33(g),
rejected by the majority in Cowart, this goal would be encouraged.
When both an employer owing compensation under the LHWCA
and a third party are liable for an employee's injury, the LHWCA
does not require the employee to make an election. The employee
may sue to recover from a third party. The amount of any recovery
(including any settlement) is set off against the amount the employer
owes under the LHWCA. 223 Accordingly, the employer has an inter-
est in not having to pay excessive compensation because of an
employee's "lowball" settlement. 224 Section 33(g) is the statutory
vehicle for protecting that legitimate interest.
The BRB interpretation of section 33(g) advances the statutory
goal of prompt payment of compensation without the necessity of a
formal award because only an employer currently making compen-
sation payments would be protected by section 33(g). Employers thus
are provided an incentive to provide compensation payments volun-
tarily if they desire the section 33(g) protection against their
employee's "lowball" settlements with third parties.
The view of the majority in Cowart has the opposite effect of
encouraging employer delay. It also strengthens an employer's hand
in negotiating with an injured employee and promises to relieve
employers of all LHWCA liability. The BRB explained this well in
O'Leary.22
5
If a claimant was injured through the negligence of a third party
and the employer denied coverage under the Act, a claimant would
be forced to sue the third party. However, even if the claimant
obtained a reasonable settlement offer, an employer could refuse to
give its consent to the third party settlement for any number of
reasons. ... This could result in a claimant not being paid any
compensation, yet the claimant would be afraid to make a third
party settlement for in so doing he might waive his rights to compen-
sation under the Act. Ultimately, a claimant going without income
for a long enough time could be forced into a third party settlement
without [an] employer's consent to obtain money.
The majority acknowledged the "harsh effects" of its ruling and
the "stark and troubling possibility that significant numbers of
injured workers or their families may be stripped of their LHWCA
benefits by this statute, and that its forfeiture penalty creates a trap
for the unwary. It also provides a powerful tool to employers who
222. See LHWCA § 14(a). The "underlying concept" of the LHWCA is that "the
employer upon being informed of an injury will voluntarily begin to pay compensa-
tion." O'Leary v Southeast Stevedoring Co., 7 Ben Rev Bd Serv (MB) 144, 147 (1977).
223. See LHWCA §§ 33(a), (b) & (f).
224. See discussion, Cowart, 112 S Ct at 2599 (Blackmun dissenting).
225. 7 Ben Rev Bd Serv (MB) at 149.
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resist liability under the Act. '2 26 The dissent summarized these
adverse policy implications:
As O'Leary made clear, allowing employers to escape all LHWCA
liability by withholding approval from any settlement, while refus-
ing to pay benefits or acknowledge liability, could hardly be thought
consistent with the purpose of encouraging prompt, voluntary
payment of LHWCA compensation. 227
Citing not one statutory purpose advanced by its decision, the
majority disclaims responsibility for these "harsh effects." What
could the majority do? After all, the "plain meaning" (and the
government's newly discovered interpretation) compelled the
outcome.
C. State Workers' Compensation Statutes-Constitutional Issues
General Motors Corp. v Romein
Contracts Clause and Due Process Protection against State Modi-
fication of Employer Liability under State Workers' Compen-
sation Statute
O'Connor J.: "[Pletitioner's suggestion that we should read
every workplace regulation into the private contractual
arrangements of employers and employees would.., severely
limit the ability of state legislatures to amend their regula-
tory legislation. Amendments could not take effect until al
existing contracts had expired.... "
In what qualifies as the most mystifying grant of certiorari of
the Term, given the result, the Court unanimously upheld the Michi-
gan Supreme Court on an issue that appears never to have been liti-
gated previously, and certainly one that had not generated a split
among the federal or state courts. Why the Court granted certiorari
only to uphold the lower court on an issue that had generated no
split may be the subtext story of General Motors Corp. v Romein.2 8
In 1980, after several years of legislative wrangling, the Michi-
gan legislature amended its workers' compensation statute in two
ways: It raised compensation benefits for workers injured after 1980
and it authorized an annual supplemental adjustment to workers
injured prior to 1980.
In 1981, the Michigan legislature enacted another workers'
compensation statute. It provided for what became known as "bene-
fit coordination": An employer was permitted to decrease workers'
compensation payments to disabled workers eligible to receive wage-
226. Cowart, 112 S Ct at 2598.
227. Id at 2602 (Blackmun dissenting).
228. 112 S Ct 1105 (1992).
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loss compensation from other employer-funded sources. The 1981
statute was effective March 31, 1982. It did not state whether the
benefit coordination provisions were applicable to all disability
payment periods after the statute's effective date, irrespective of
when the disabled worker first qualified for workers' compensation
or whether it applied only to those qualifying for workers' compen-
sation after the statute's effective date. Some employers in Michigan
applied benefits coordination to all disabled workers irrespective of
when they were injured; some applied it only prospectively.
A judicial battle in state court finally resolved the question. The
Michigan Supreme Court sided with those who argued that the 1981
statute's benefit coordination provisions apply to all payment peri-
ods after its effective date, regardless of the date the disabled worker
had been injured.2 29 Many Michigan employers who had not applied
benefit coordination retroactively soon demanded reimbursement
from employees. Before the Michigan Supreme Court ruled on a
motion for reconsideration, however, legislation was introduced in
the Michigan legislature to reverse the effect of Chambers. Enacted
in 1987, this legislation provided (1) that employers who had not
coordinated benefits prior to Chambers could not now seek reim-
bursement from affected employees, and (2) that employers who had
coordinated benefits of previously disabled workers under the 1981
law must refund the benefits withheld.
As a result of the 1987 statute, petitioners in this case were
ordered to refund nearly $25 million. They alleged that the refund
order was unconstitutional: The retroactivity of the 1987 statute was
alleged to have impaired the obligation of contract, in violation of
the Constitution's Contract Clause,230 and violated the Due Process
Clause.
In Contract Clause cases, the threshold issue is whether there
was a contract that state law substantially impaired. Here the Court
held there was not.
General Motors argued that implicit in every employment
contract is a promise, required by the state's workers' compensation
law, that the employer promises to pay the amount of workers'
compensation legally required for each payment period. Having
performed this obligation, by making payments for any disability
229. Chambers v General Motors Corp., 375 NW2d 715 (1985). This ruling was
contrary to a concurrent resolution of both houses of the Michigan legislature that
declared that the benefit coordination provisions of the 1981 statute "was 'not designed'
to disrupt benefits which were already being received by date." Cowart, 112 S Ct at
1108 (quoting Senate Concurrent Resolution 575, adopted by the Senate on Apr 1,
1982, and by the House on May 18, 1982. 1982 Senate J 626, 706-07; 1982 House J
1262).
230. Article I, section 10 of the Constitution provides: "No State shall ... pass
any... Law impairing the Obligation of Contracts."
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period, the employer argued, it has "a settled expectation that cannot
be undone by later state legislation. ' 2 3'
The Court disagreed. "[T]he contracting parties here in no way
manifested assent to limiting disability payments in accordance with
the 1981 law allowing coordination of benefits. '232 The employer,
moreover, may not rely on past payment periods as being closed,
regardless of assent, because "the alleged right to rely on past
payment periods as closed was [not] part of the Michigan law at the
time of the original contract. '233 Nor is there anything else in Michi-
gan workers' compensation law that may fairly be seen as creating
an implied "contractual term allowing an employer to depend on the
closure of past disability compensation periods.
234
A contrary conclusion in General Motors would have had the
effect of making all state regulations implied terms of every contract
entered into while they are in effect.235 This broad proposition
exceeded the Court's willingness to protect established interests
through the Contracts Clause. "For the most part, state laws are
implied into private contracts regardless of the assent of the parties
only when those laws affect the validity, construction, and enforce-
ment of contracts. '23 6 Michigan's 1987 statute requiring refund of
withheld employee benefits served none of these functions, accord-
ing to the Court. With specific reference to its affecting the enforce-
ability of the employment contracts here, the Court ruled that "[tihe
parties still have the same ability to enforce the bargained-for terms
of the employment contracts that they did before the 1987 statute
was enacted. 237
Most telling, perhaps, was the Court's rejoinder.
[Pletitioner's suggestion that we should read every workplace regu-
lation into the private contractual arrangements of employers and
employees would expand the definition of contract so far that the
constitutional provision would lose its anchoring purpose [-the
private ordering of personal and business affairs]. Instead, the Clause
would protect against all changes in legislation, regardless of the
effect of those changes on bargained for agreements. The employ-
ment contract, in petitioners' view, could incorporate workplace
safety regulations, employment tax obligations, and laws prohibit-
ing workplace discrimination, even if these laws are not intended
to affect private contracts ... between the employer and employees
... [Pletitioners' construction would severely limit the ability of
231. General Motors, 112 S Ct at 1110.
232. Id.
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state legislatures to amend their regulatory legislation. Amendments
could not take effect until all existing contracts [had] expired .... 238
All of this leaves somewhat unanswered the question of why
the Court granted certiorari in the first place. Clearly, some group
on the Court was sufficiently alarmed that the Michigan legislature
could enact legislation having the effect of costing a major American
corporation $25 million. More fundamentally, this certiorari grant
could signal a new era for protecting established expectations
through the Contract Clause. Here, there was no assent to the terms
General Motors attempted to have inferred into each of its employ-
ment contracts. Plus, its implied contract theory would have shack-
led state legislative reform excessively. But what if an employer were
to add to its employment contracts explicitly what General Motors
creatively attempted to have added to them implicitly? Would a later
change in state law such as Michigan's 1987 law then substantially
impair the bargained-for conditions of employment? General Motors
raises that issue to be sure. That may have been a sufficient reason
to vote to grant certiorari in this case.
VII. Miscellaneous
A. Veteran's Reemployment Rights Act
King v St. Vincent's Hospital
Reasonableness Limitation on the Amount of Leave Time
Employer Must Provide under the Statute
Souter J.: "[T]he simplicity of subsection (d) was deliberate,
consistent with a plain meaning to provide its benefit without
conditions on length of service."
Less than a year after the United States military victory in
Operation Desert Storm, an employer came to the Court asking that
it read the Veterans' Reemployment Rights Act (Act) 239 as implicitly
limiting the length of military service after which a member of the
armed forces no longer retains a right to civilian reemployment. To
the astonishment of probably none, the Court unanimously 240 refused
to find such implicit limits on the rights of returning military
veterans.
238. Id. Nor did the retroactive effect of the 1987 Michigan statute violate the
due process clause: It was a rational means of "preserving the delicate legislative
compromise [of] giving workers injured before 1982 their full benefits without coor-
dination, but not the greater increases given to subsequently injured workers . ..
Having now lost the battle in the Michigan Legislature, petitioners wished to continue
the war in court. Losing a political skirmish, however, in itself creates no ground for
constitutional relief." Id at 1112.
239. 38 USC § 2024(d).
240. King v St. Vincent's Hospital, 112 S Ct 570 (1991). Justice Thomas did not
participate.
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William "Sky" King,2 41 while a member of the Alabama National
Guard, applied to become a Command Sergeant Major in the Active
Guard/Reserve (AGR). Under Army regulations, senior noncommis-
sioned officers of that rank are required to undertake a commitment
to serve a three-year tour of duty as a condition of joining the AGR
program. 242 King requested a three-year leave of absence from his
employer, St. Vincent's Hospital. His request was denied. The hospi-
tal advised him that the request was unreasonable and, therefore,
beyond the protections afforded by the Veterans' Reemployment
Rights Act.
King brought a declaratory judgment action in federal district
court to ascertain whether the Act provided reemployment rights
following tours of duty as long as three years or whether there was,
implicitly, a reasonableness limitation to the rights the Act preserved.
The district court held that the Act imposed a reasonableness test
and that King's three-year request exceeded it per se. The Eleventh
Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed, two judges agreeing that a three-
year leave is per se unreasonable and the third judge concluding that
Congress intended no per se rule but King's request here was
unreasonable.
Resolving a split in the circuits on the question whether the Act
imposes a reasonableness limitation, the Supreme Court reviewed
the "plain meaning" of the Act's text. Section 2024(d) of the Act
states that "[any covered employee] shall upon request be granted a
leave of absence by such person's employer for the period required
to perform active duty for training or inactive duty training." Noth-
ing in the text suggests any time limitation on the leave of absence
that employer's must provide.
The employer argued that those entitled to a leave under the
authority of section 2024(d) are "returned" to their positions
following training, according to the text of the Act, while reservists
protected under other provisions of the section 2024 are "restored"
to their employment position. 243 The employer argued that Congress
must have intended that section 2024(d) leaves of absence would be
granted to those who maintain an employer-employee relationship
to which they "return." Accordingly, Congress must have intended
a reasonableness limitation: "[TIhe very notion of such a continuing
relationship is incompatible with absences as lengthy as King's. '244
Second, section 2024(d) requires veterans "to 'report to work at the
241. Writing for the Court, Justice Souter stated, perhaps a little peevishly, that
"[h]ow and why petitioner's nickname claimed a place in the caption of this case is a
mystery of the record." King v St. Vincent's Hospital, 112 S Ct 570, 572 nI (1991).
242. Id at 572.
243. Id at 573.
244. Id.
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beginning of the next regularly scheduled work period' " following
expiration of their military tour of duty. 245 This requirement, the
employer argued, is impractical for those who have been absent from
their jobs as long as King anticipated being absent. Congress could
not have intended, therefore, that section 2024(d) leaves apply to
workers away so long. Finally, the employer argued that filling posi-
tions with responsible replacements would be difficult if "incum-
bents could be turned out so abruptly after serving for so long, upon
the prior incumbent's equally abrupt return. '246
Justice Souter and the Court would have none of this. A leave
provision for veterans without a reasonableness limitation might be
"ungainly" and impose burdens on both employers and workers,
"[blut to grant all this is not to find equivocation in the statute's
silence, so as to render it susceptible to interpretative choice. '247
When Congress desired to place a time limit on veterans rights under
the Act, moreover, it placed those limits explicitly in the statute.248
"Given the examples of affirmative limitations on reemployment
benefits conferred by neighboring provisions, we infer that the
simplicity of subsection (d) was deliberate, consistent with a plain
meaning to provide its benefit without conditions on length of
service.'249
Perhaps the most striking evidence of Congress' intent not to
limit the duration of section 2024(d) leaves of absence was its plac-
ing the AGR program under the protection of section 2024 in 1980.
It would seem to make little sense to require King, and those of his
high rank, to serve three years as a condition of participating in the
AGR program, place that program under section 2024's protection,
but limit the protection to something less than the period King was
required to serve. 250
It is difficult to measure the impact of this case on day-to-day
administration of personnel policy. As this nation decreases the size
of its active military, it can be expected that the reserve components
245. Id.
246. Id.
247. King v St. Vincent's Hospital, 112 S Ct at 573.
248. See discussion of sections 2024(a) and 2024(b)(1), each of which explicitly
contains time limits on veterans' rights. Id at 574.
249. Id. The Court reminded that the "cardinal rule" is to read the statute as a
whole. It quoted Judge Learned Hand's famous observation that "[w]ords are not
pebbles in alien juxtaposition; they have only a communal existence; and not only
does the meaning of each interpenetrate the other, but all in their aggregate take their
purport from the setting in which they are used .. " Id (quoting NLRB v Federbush
Co., 121 F2d 954, 957 (2d Cir 1941)). The Court also cited United States VHartwell,
73 US (6 Wall) 385, 396 (1868) for the rule that "in construing statute court should
adopt that sense of words which best harmonizes with context and promotes policy
and objectives of legislature." Id at 574 nlO.
250. See id at 575 n14.
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will assume increased importance. Programs like AGR, that provide
active duty training for reservists, may well proliferate. The Court
was not prepared to be the grinch here. Nor was it prepared to take
responsibility for disrupting business. Again, rules of statutory
construction were sufficient for the Court to avoid responsibility.
B. Immigration and Naturalization Act
Immigration and Naturalization Service v National Center for
Immigration Rights
Attorney General's Authority under the INA to Limit Work
Opportunities of Undocumented Aliens Released on Bond Pend-
ing Deportation Hearing
Stevens J.: "The contested regulation is wholly consistent with
[the] established concern of immigration law ... 'to protect
against displacement of workers in the United States.'"
Section 242(a) of the Immigration and Naturalization Act (INA)
authorizes the attorney general to arrest excludable aliens and,
pending a deportability determination, either to hold them in custody
or release them on bond "containing such conditions as the Attorney
General may prescribe." 251 Immigration and Naturalization Service
v National Center for Immigration Rights,252 resolved the "narrow
question of statutory construction ' 253 of whether INA section 242(a)
prohibits promulgation of a rule generally requiring that release
bonds contain a condition forbidding unauthorized employment
pending determination of deportability.
Since 1983, Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) regu-
lations have contained the following provision regarding release
bonds of deportable aliens:254
(ii) Condition against unauthorized employment. A condition
barring employment shall be included in an appearance and deliv-
ery bond in connection with a deportation proceeding or bond posted
for the release of an alien in exclusion proceedings, unless the
District Director determines that employment is appropriate.
Several individuals and organizations challenged the lawfulness
of this regulation. Based on the assumption that the regulation
constituted a blanket bar against working, applicable to aliens
authorized to work as well as those having no such authority, these
groups argued that the regulation exceeded the attorney general's
statutory authority and violated the due process clause of the
Constitution. On a broader front, they argued that any limitation on
251. 8 USC § 1252(a)(1).
252. 112 S Ct 551 (1991).
253. Id at 553.
254. 8 CFR § 103.6(a)(2)(ii) (1991).
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employment in the release bond would be unlawful as such bonds
may only contain conditions tending to insure the aliens' appearance
at future deportation proceedings. Concern with an alien working
while on bond is peripheral and insufficient to be placed in every
release bond.
The district court entered summary judgment, agreeing that the
regulation exceeded the attorney general's statutory authority. The
Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed: The regulation bars all
employment; it is overbroad since the attorney general's statutory
authority to impose release conditions must relate either to securing
the alien's appearance at a subsequent hearing or to protecting the
nation from active subversives; and bond conditions, in any event,
must be individualized and, therefore, any "blanket rule" promul-
gated by the attorney general is invalid. 255
The Supreme Court unanimously reversed. As a threshold matter
the meaning of the regulation needed to be clarified. Though not
without some substantial ambiguity, it was found to bar only unau-
thorized employment-as the government represented to the Court
was its understanding and its policy. 25 6
The Court further found that the attorney general acted within
his statutory authority in promulgating such a narrow regulation
because his authority extends both to securing an alien's appearance
at a subsequent hearing and protecting the Nation from any "unac-
ceptable threats. '257 The purpose of the regulation was "to protect
against the displacement of workers in the United States. '258 This
being one of the primary purposes in restricting immigration, 259 the
contested regulation is within the attorney general's statutory
authority.26o
Finally, the Court agreed that release bond conditions need be
individualized, but found that the regulation, construed in light of
the INS administrative procedures, contemplates individual deter-
minations: whether the alien is authorized to perform work because
of a colorable claim of citizenship or because the alien has applied
for asylum, or some other reason.
This case implicates a core interest: the opportunity to work
pending deportation procedures. Without work, the alien would find
"it difficult, if not impossible," to provide necessary food and shel-
ter and employ counsel for representation in the upcoming hearing
255. National Center For Immigration Rights, Inc. v INS, 913 F2d 1350, 1353-
74 (9th Cir 1990).
256. INS, 112 S Ct at 556-57.
257. Id at 558.
258. 48 Fed Reg 51142 (1983).
259. See Sure-Tan, Inc. v NLRB, 467 US 883, 893-94 (1984).
260. INS, 112 S Ct at 558.
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to determine deportability. 261 If this case stands for the unspecta-
cular proposition that the attorney general may bar an alien from
working only when the alien already is barred from working under
our immigration laws, this case may be the biggest nonevent of the
Term. The district court and the court of appeals certainly believed,
however, that the regulation, in practice, had the effect of barring
employment more broadly. To the extent that this case caused the
INS to commit itself to barring unauthorized employment, and no
other, the outcome seems to have been worth the effort.
C. Rule 11 Sanctions
Willy v Coastal Corporation
Rule 11 Applicability When Court Lacks Subject Matter
Jurisdiction
Rehnquist C.J.: "[Tlhe District Court acted within the scope of
the Federal Rules and ... the sanction may constitutionally
be applied even when subject-matter jurisdiction is eventu-
ally found lacking...."
In 1990, the Court held that a district court may impose Rule 11
sanctions for filing a frivolous complaint even though the sanction
order was entered after the plaintiff voluntarily dismissed the suit. 262
In Willy v Coastal Corporation,2 63 a related issue was addressed:
whether a district court's exercise of judicial power to grant Rule 11
sanctions is an unconstitutional act in the absence of subject-matter
jurisdiction. The Court unanimously held that the lack of subject-
matter jurisdiction does not render the imposition of Rule 11 sanc-
tions unlawful.
Willy sued the Coastal Corporation (Coastal) in a Texas state
court raising a variety of claims arising out of his having been
dismissed as "in-house" counsel. In particular, Willy alleged that he
had been terminated due to his refusal to violate various federal and
state environmental laws and that the termination thus violated the
"whistle-blower" provisions of those statutes.
Over Willy's objection the suit was removed to federal court.
Willy argued that the action did not "arise under" federal law and,
therefore, the district court lacked subject-matter jurisdiction. The
district court disagreed and subsequently granted Coastal's motion
to dismiss for failure to state a claim, dismissed all pendent state
claims, and imposed Rule 11 sanctions, in the form of attorney fees,
261. See id at 557 n6.
262. Cooter & Gell v Hartnarx Corp., 496 US 384 (1990).
263. 112 S Ct 1076 (1992).
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against Willy and his attorney. 264 None of the sanctionable conduct
was related to the initial effort opposing the Court's subject-matter
jurisdiction. 26 5
The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals concluded that the district
court lacked subject-matter jurisdiction, agreeing with Willy that his
action raised no claims arising under federal law. But the court of
appeals affirmed the imposition of sanctions and remanded the case
to the district court to recompute their amount. On remand, the
district court imposed sanctions in the amount of $19,307, the attor-
ney fees incurred in responding to the sanctionable conduct. 266
Before the Supreme Court, Willy argued that Congress did not
authorize Rule 11 sanctions against parties who prevail on jurisdic-
tional grounds and if it did, such authorization would be unconsti-
tutional. The constitutional argument was that if the district court
lacks Article III judicial authority to hear a matter, it also lacks
constitutional power to assert judicial authority over a party in that
action by imposing sanctions.
Rejecting this argument, a unanimous Supreme Court reasoned
that Congress did intend that Rule 11 operate in cases such as this.
The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure "apply to all district court civil
proceedings," limited only by the command that they "not 'abridge,
enlarge or modify any substantive right.' ",267 This limitation includes
the charge that the Federal Rules may not be applied so as "to extend
or restrict the jurisdiction conferred by a statute. ' 268 Imposing Rule
11 sanctions in the absence of subject-matter jurisdiction does not
extend the district court's statutory jurisdiction, the Supreme Court
held, because the district court thereby makes no judgment on the
merits of the underlying dispute.
Nor is Congress' conferral of judicial authority unconstitutional,
the Supreme Court further reasoned. Congress is empowered by
Article III of the Constitution to establish lower federal courts and
this power includes authority to make all laws "necessary and
proper" to their establishment. This constitutional power authorizes
Congress to "enact laws regulating the conduct of [district] courts
[including] . . . 'prescrib[ing] housekeeping rules for federal
264. The Court found that plaintiff's counsel" 'create[d] a blur of absolute confu-
sion' " by, among other things, including "a 1,200 page, unindexed, unnumbered pile
of materials." This was viewed by the Court to constitute a " 'conscious and wanton
affront to the judicial process, this Court, and opposing counsel.' "Id at 1078 (quoting
the district court opinion). The district court concluded that the conduct was " 'irre-
sponsible at a minimum and at worst intentionally harassing.'" Id.
265. Id.
266. Id.
267. Id at 1079 (quoting the Rules Enabling Act, 28 USC § 2072).
268. Willy v Coastal Corp., 112 S Ct at 1079. See Sibbach v Wilson, 312 US 1
(1941).
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courts.' "269 Rule 11 falls within this constitutional grant of congres-
sional authority, just as Congress may authorize "that a judgment
rendered in a case in which it was ultimately concluded that the
District Court was without jurisdiction was nonetheless res judicata
on collateral attack made by one of the parties. '27 0 The rationalizing
principle is that "the maintenance of orderly procedure, even in the
wake of a jurisdiction ruling later found to be mistaken-justifies
the conclusion that the sanction ordered here need not be upset. '27 1
269. Willy, 112 S Ct at 1080 (quoting Hanna v Plummer, 380 US 460,473 (1965)).
270. See Chicot County Drainabe District v Baxter State Bank, 308 US 371 (1940).
The Court also cited United States v United Mine Workers, 330 US 258 (1947) (contempt
citation upheld although district court lacked subject-matter jurisdiction).
271. Willy, 112 S Ct at 1088. The Court distinguished United States Catholic
Conference v Abortion Rights Mobilization, Inc., 487 US 72 (1988), that had reversed
a contempt order by a district court lacking subject-matter jurisdiction over the case
from which the contempt order arose. There, the contempt order was to coerce compli-
ance with an order-a document subpoena-the district court lacked jurisdiction to
enter. Here, the Rule 11 sanction was to punish a party for conduct prejudicial to
orderly procedure.
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